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Growing Pains: The Why and How of Canadian Law Firm Expansion
Abstract
Over the last decade, the Canadian corporate law firm, like its counterparts in other industrialized
countries, has undergone a profound transformation, the most remarkable feature of which has been the
rapid growth of individual firms. Whereas a mere decade ago only one Canadian firm could boast of
having more than 100 lawyers, today there are at least 19 firms that can make this claim. Accompanying
the firms' rapid growth has been their steady expansion into distant national and international markets.
Significantly, even when that expansion has been confined to local markets, law firms have invoked a
much broader array of growth instruments than in the past. In place of singular reliance upon the
standard practice of recruitment directly from law schools and subsequent promotion through the ranks,
law firms have shown themselves willing to deploy other methods including lateral recruitment ('cherry
picking'), greenfielding, affiliations,and mergers. Interestingly, while the rationale for rapid law firm growth
has been given belated, though careful, attention by legal academics, the issue of the mechanisms by
which that growth can be achieved has been virtually ignored. This oversight is curious. By understanding
the calculus governing the choice of growth instruments, important light can be cast on the structure of
and rationale for the modern law firm, and on the way in which it has coped with the stresses and strains
of a dramatically changing market environment.
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Ronald J. Daniels*

GROWING PAINS:
T H E WHY AND HOW
OF LAW FIRM EXPANSIONt

Over the last decade, the Canadian corporate law firm,' like its counterparts in other industrialized countries, has undergone a profound transf o r m a t i ~ n the
, ~ most remarkable feature of which has been the rapid
growth of individual firms. Whereas a mere decade ago only one
Canadian firm could boast of having more than 100 lawyers, today there
are at least 19 firms that can make this claim.' Accompanying the firms'
rapid growth has been their steady expansion into distant national and
international markets. Significantly, even when that expansion has been
confined to local markets, law firms have invoked a much broader array
of growth instruments than in the past. In place of singular reliance upon
the standard practice of recruitment directly from law schools and subsequent promotion through the ranks, law firms have shown themselves
willing to deploy other methods including lateral recruitment ('cherry
picking'), greenfielding, affiliations,and mergers.' Interestingly, while the
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superb research assistance rendered through all stages of this project. Debra Forman.
the international business and trade law librarian at the Faculty of Law, University
of Toronto, ingeniously and doggedly tracked down elusive data. Pia Bruni cheerfully
and proficiently typed large portions of this article, as well as coordinating our
interview schedule. Jim Baillie, Bruce Chapman. Ron Gilson, Steven Richardson, and
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as did participants in workshops at the Canadian Law and Economics Association's
annual meeting and at Georgetown Law School. Thanks are also owed to senior
pzrtners at 40 or so of Canada's leading law firms, who gave so generously of their
time during this project. My greatest debt of gratitude is, however, to Michael
Trebilcock. Without his inspiration and guidance, this project would never have been
initiated. Of course, any responsibility for errors is purely my own. The research for
this article was completed in the summer of 1990, and is current as at that date.
In this article, I use the terms corporate law firm and law firm interchangeably. This
is because my focus is exclusively on the large corporate law firm. Such firms are
characterized by their commitment to servicing the needs of corporate as opposed to
individual clients. Although much of the analysis developed in this article may be easily
applied to non-corporate law firms, there are several distinctive challenges being faced
by small and medium-sized firms that must be accounted for in considering their
growth and performance, and which I have ignored.
The operation of the modern corporate law firm is extensively explored in R. Nelson
Partners with Power (Berkeley: University of California Press 1988).
See section III below.
See Galanter 'Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary United States' in
R. Dingwall and P. Lewis (eds) Tb Sociology of the Ifofessions (London: MacMillan 1983)
162.
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rationale for rapid law firm growth has been given belated, though
careful, attention by legal academic^,^ the issue of the mechanisms by
which that growth can be achieved has been virtually ignored. This
oversight is curious. By understanding the calculus governing the choice
of growth instruments, important light can be cast on the structure of
and rationale for the modern law firm, and on the way in which it has
coped with the stresses and strains of a dramatically changing market
environment.
In this article, I examine the changing nature of the law firm in
several distinct stages. In section I, I provide a thumbnail sketch of the
activities, structure, and governance of the modern corporate law firm.
In section 11, I discuss the theory of the firm and its application to the
legal partnership. Then, in section 111, I examine in greater detail the
phenomenon of rapid law firm growth, focusing on the burgeoning size
and geographic scope of the firm. Although Galanter and Palay have
offered a supply-side theory of law firm growth, I argue that it is beset
by several deficiencies, and offer an alternative explanation for the
phenomenon. In section IV,I evaluate the range of different instruments
available to bring about growth, while remaining attentive to the law
firm's dual objectives: to provide the level and type of services that best
satisfy consumer demand and to minimize the internal costs of production, particularly those costs that are related to lawyer opportunism.
Unfortunately, no instrument is perfect in being able to fulfil both of
these objectives across all contexts, and I develop a hierarchy that ranks
different growth instruments on the basis of their relative costs and benefits in local, national, and international settings. Finally, in section V,
drawing on the results of an extensive set of interviews I conducted over
a one-year period with senior lawyers in 40 leading Canadian law firms,
I evaluate the strength of the theoretical claims advanced in section IV.
I

The modern corporate law firm

The modern corporate law firm specializes in the delivery of complex
legal services to large, sophisticated corporate clients. The services
provided by corporate law firms take the form of advice rendered to
clients on how to maximize the value they can lawfully receive from
transactions executed within the contours of the existing legal frame-

5 See M. Galanter and T. Palay 'Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion to Partner
Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms' (1990) 76 Va. LR 747.

work.=One of the hallmarks of the corporate law firm is the wide scope
and depth of its expertise. The same law firm may have legal specialists
practising in areas as diverse as tax, antitrust, securities law, real estate,
bankruptcy, litigation, and commercial law. The corporate law firm's distinctive strength comes from its ability to create ad hoc teams of lawyers
drawn from a number of different specialties to provide advice to clients
respecting their activities. For example, the tide of mergers and acquisitions work that swept North American markets during the 1980s routinely required lawyers fi-om a number of different practice areas to work
together in structuring these transactions or defensive responses to them.
The highly specialized nature of the corporate law firm's production
function is also reflected in the extensive reliance the firm places on
support staff, both paralegal and administrative. The paralegal staff
enables the firm's lawyers to devolve responsibility over relatively mundane, routine tasks such as reviewing and filing court documents, preparing and filing incorporations and corporate changes, and examining and
registering real estate titles; the large, highly differentiated administrative staff allows lawyers to benefit from sophisticated legal research
services, round-the-clock secretarial and word-processing facilities, as well
as other sundry services (catering, messenger, telecopier, and so forth).
Most law firms are structured as professional partnerships.' For the

-

6 As Gilson has observed: '[Wlhat business lawyers r e d y d o their potential to create
value - is simply this: Lawyers function as tram&ion cost engineers, devising efficient
mechanisms which bridge the gap between ... [the] world of perfect markets and
the less-than-perfect reality of effecting transactions in this world.' 'Value Creation
by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing' (1984) 94 Yale LJ 239 at 255.
See also R. Kagan and R. Rosen 'On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm
Practice' (1985) 37 Stan. LR 399.
7 In some American states, law firms can be organized as true limited liability
corporations, permitting limited liability for lawyers and even allowing non-lawyer
investors to hold equity in the firm. These firms are, however, exceptional. Although
other American states and at least one Canadian province, Alberta, permit law firms
to incorporate, the benefits of incorporation are largely confined to the realization of
certain tax benefits. The firm does not enjoy limited liability insofar as creditor claims
are concerned, nor are non-lawyers entitled to hold equity interests. See J. Robert
Prichard 'Incorporation by Lawyers' in J. Evans and M. Trebilcock (eds) Lauym and
the Consumer Interest (Toronto: Butterworths 1982) 303. American data on limited liability is reviewed in B. Eaton A.ofes.ssiofltL1C o ' p w a t h and Associath, Business Organizations, vol. 17 (New York: Matthew Bender 1987), 9-44.2-9-46. See also the debate
between Carr and Mathewson and Gilson respecting the role of limited liability as a
barrier to entry into the legal profession: J. Carr and F. Mathewson 'Unlimited Liability as a Barrier to Entry' (1988) 96 J. of Pol. Econ. 766; and R. Gilson 'Unlimited
Liability and Law Firm Organization: Tax Factors and the Direction of Causation'
Working Paper no. 63. John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at Stanford
University.
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most part, the partnership form of organization means that law firm
partners have unlimited personal liability for debts incurred by the partnership. Consequently, each partner's personal wealth can be seized to
satisfy debts incurred by other members of the partnership in the course
of partnership business. In addition to personal liability, partnership
status also confers clear rights upon partners to participate in the firm's
management. Usually these management rights stipulate an entitlement
to be kept apprised of the firm's activities and financial status, to be
consulted on relatively normal course changes, and to be able to vote
directly, often on the basis of supra-majority voting rules, on significant
changes. Partnership status also includes a right to share in whatever
income remains at the end of an accounting period after all fixed claimants have been paid. In this respect, partners are the residual claimants
upon the firm's income stream; that is, they can withdraw funds from the
partnership only after all fixed claims have been paid. The actual level of
participation among lawyers varies from firm to firm depending on the
criteria used in the compensation calculus. Some firms employ a lockstep
system whereby all lawyers at the same level of seniority earn the same
income, whereas most other firms rely on a more complex, nonmechanistic sharing system that includes attention to seniority, to
marginal productivity, and to efforts at firm promotion and development.' The final characteristic of partnership is more secure, often
lifetime, tenure. Although the constitution of most firms stipulates that
partners can be removed from the partnership without causing the entire
partnership to dissolve, such action occurs only rarely and is accompanied by extensive procedural protection for the departing partner.
Although, for the most part, partners in the modern corporate law
firm are all lawyers, not all lawyers in the firm are partners. Until
recently, most firms were organized around a two-tiered hierarchy of
partners and associate^.^ Associate lawyers are typically recruited directly

8 Examples of lockstep firms are Clifford, Chance in Britain and Cravath, Swaine,
and Moore in New York City. For a h r t h e r discussion on the systems available
to compensate partners and the incentives each create, see R. Gilson and R.
Mnmkin 'Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Enquiry into
Corporate Law Firms and How Partners Split Profits' (1985) 37 Stan. LR 313.
9 Traditionally, Canadian law firms have relied on a third tier in the cog of the firm
machinery: apprentice or articling students. Upon graduation from law school,
students will be hired for a one-year apprenticeship period with a law firm.
Although the student provides valuable services for the firm during this period, the
principal purpose of the articling is to allow the firm to determine whether the
student should be invited at the end of the year to rejoin the firm as an associate
lawyer. On average, most firms will hire back 50 per cent of the students as
associate lawyers.

from law school and hired on the basis of fixed salaries, employment at
will, and commitments on the part of the firm to furnish some on-thejob training and to consider the associate for promotion to partner after
a fixed interval of from five to ten years.'' In return, the lawyer agrees
to furnish legal services to clients under the supervision and guidance of
the firm's partners. The level of partner oversight diminishes quickly as
the newly minted lawyer establishes her competence. Indeed, well before
they are promoted to partnership, most associate lawyers will enjoy
substantial control over small and medium-sized transactions and will
have had extensive client contact, perhaps even to the point of serving as
the lawyer responsible for coordinating all of a particular client's needs
within the firm. The extensive period of time a lawyer serves as an
associate with a firm provides partners with an abundance of information
upon which to base a decision regarding promotion to partnership.
Obviously, the more elaborate the set of actual observations of associates
under a variety of conditions, the more confident partners can be about
promotion. Given the defects in the market for human capital, internal
recruitment and promotion is the principal mechanism for filling the
firm's labour needs.
11

The theory of thefirm and the legal partnership

k T H E THEORY O F T H E FIRM

The theory of the firm, as propounded by Coase and others," is focused
on the issue of when the gains from joint economic activity will be
extracted through discrete market interactions, that is, simple contracts,
and when they will be generated internally through the firm.12According

10 For a full explication of this relationship, see A. Leibowitz and R. Tollison 'Earning
and Learning in Law Firms' (1978) 7 J. Lgal Studies 65. Under the 'up o r out
system' that is used by most corporate law firms in determining promotion to
partnership, associate lawyers not recruited to partnership are expected to seek out
other employment, invariably in a smaller, less prestigious firm or in the in-house
counsel department of a corporate client. T h e rationale for the 'up o r out system'
is described by R. Gilson and R. Mnookin 'Coming of Age in a Corporate Law
Firm: T h e Economics of Associate Career Patterns' (1989) 41 Stan. LR 567.
11 R. Coase T h e Nature of the Firm' (1937) 4 Eco~wmica386. Reprinted in G.J. Stigler
and K.E. Boulding (eds) Readings in Price Theoty (Homewood. Ill.: Richard D. Irwin
1952).
12 Take, for example, the production of a modern automobile. Under the rather
implausible assumption that only market transactions will be used to coordinate
the production of the automobile, a manufacturer would have to enter into a wide
range of contractual arrangements to produce a single product. These would
include discrete contracts for the supply of various intermediate goods, for the
performance of various piecemeal tasks along the assembly line, for the provision
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to Coase, the answer to this inquiry is supplied by a careful weighing of
the costs and benefits of both forms of organization. Simply put, as the
size of the firm increases, its advantages over markets, in terms of savings
in search costs ('discovering what the relevant costs are'), negotiation and
contracting costs, and sundry enforcement costs, are eclipsed by the
accrual of costs emanating from decreasing returns to the entrepreneurial
function, increasing potential for entrepreneurial mistakes in making
resource allocation decisions, and the inherent cost advantages of smallscale production.
By and large, subsequent scholars have remained faithful to the basic
inquiry framed by Coase, that is, analyzing the firm in terms of its market
alternative, but have differed in their identification of and emphasis upon
other costs and benefits of the firm form. For instance, while some
scholars have focused on the ability of the firm's centralized monitoring
system to control internal agency cost^,'^ others have emphasized the
salutary effects of the firm's ownership structure," while still others have

of various marketing and promotional activities, for the transportation of finished
products to distributors and retailers, and for the provision of post-purchase
product support. Were an automobile produced in such a manner, it is clear that
the costs of manufacture would clearly be prohibitive. Far more efficient is a
production scheme in which the performance of various routine functions are
internalized within the firm.
13 Alchian and Demsetz concentrated on the role that the firm plays in monitoring
the performance of members of the team production function. According to these
commentators, the value of the firm lies in its ability to achieve economies in
monitoring the inputs of factors into the production process when it is difficult, if
not impossible, to ascertain the ex post marginal productivity of individuals involved
in joint production by measuring their individual output. Monitoring is an
important function owing to the natural propensity of employees to behave opportunistically by refusing to expend their maximum efforts in carrying out economic
activity within the firm. Opportunism can take the form of 'shirking' (consuming
more leisure than if one were forced to bear its costs) and 'perquisite consumption'
(consuming resources that enhance the personal utility of the employee at the expense of the firm). Increasing firm growth strains the capacity of the firm to detect
such conduct, leading to a commensurate increase in the attractiveness of market
contracting - despite its attendant costs. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz 'Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization' (1972) Am. Econ. Rev. 777.
14 Fama and Jensen, for instance, postulate that the efficacy of monitoring by residual
claimants (the persons bearing the risk that the flow of future receipts paid tn the
firm will be less than the promised payments to various agents of the firm) informs
the nature of the internal structure of the firm. Particularly, Fama and Jensen
argue that for small, relatively simple forms of production, the firm will be
structured so that the residual claimants are also the managers of the firm. By
virtue of the fact that the residual claimants' returns are a function of their capacity
to control internal opportunism, these individuals will have the incentive to manage
the firm effectively. However, as the scale and complexity of production increases,
thereby increasing the necessity both for specialized provision of capital and for

devoted considerable attention to the capacity of the firm's internal
governance system to overcome innate opportunism problems accompanying asset-specific investment.I5Strands of all of these theories can be
found in the many rationales that have been developed to explain the
survival value of the legal partnership.
B. THE THEORY OF THE LAW FIRM

Following the structure of the inquiry established by Coase, the rationale
for the legal partnership can be explicated best by considering first the
particular benefits that can be derived from joint production in the
context of legal services, and second, the features of the law firm
partnership that make it a superior vehicle to markets in realizing these
benefits.16 In terms of the former question, four principal benefits accrue
from joint production of legal services. The first relates to the benefits of
task specialization. By parcelling out parts of a legal transaction to
different lawyers on the basis of their relative expertise, the overall
quality of legal advice tendered to a client can be expected to increase.
This quality advantage is due to the growing complexity of law in

specialized management, the ability of individuals to perform both tasks competently
is diminished. As a consequence, a variety of institutionalized monitoring
arrangements must be relied on to ensure that the conduct of decision-makers is
aligned with the objectives of residual claimants. On the basis of this core intuition,
Fama and Jensen reflect on the nature of internal governance mechanisms that are
used to organize production in organizations as diverse as the conventional
corporation and the Catholic Church. E. Fama and M. Jensen 'Separation of
Ownership and Control' (1983) 26 J. Law W Econ. 301; 'Agency Problems and
Residual Claims' ibid. 327.
15 Oliver Williamson emphasizes the role that the firm, as a quintessential governance mechanism, can play in controlling opportunism of a special kind, that is,
opportunism involving exploitation of bargaining power that arises from investments in asset-specific goods. Such goods are characterized by their customization
for specific applications, and by the fact that their value in their next-best use is
considerably less than the use for which they were originally designed. One way
of overcoming the perverse incentives emanating from asset-specific investments is
to internalize production in the firm. When both parties to a transaction are
employed by the same firm, the revenues accruing from their economic activity
will be aggregated in the same pool. As a consequence of earnings integration,
neither of the parties will have an incentive to engage in strategic gaming of the
other. Any redistributional benefit that one party extracts from the other will accrue
back to both through each party's share in the overall returns to the firm.
Supplementing the effect of common ownership in correcting perverse incentives,
the firm's internal governance mechanism is also able to create an apparatus that
can fairly and expeditiously resolve disputes among parties involved in the firm's
joint production. See 0. Williamson The Ecommic Institutions of Capitolism (New York:
Free Press 1985).
16 A much more expansive discussion of these issues can be found in R.J. Daniels
'The Law Firm as an Efficient Community' (1992) 37 McGiU LJ 801.
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modern society, which undermines the capacity of the generalist to keep
abreast of legal developments in a way that an individual can who devotes
all her effort and energy to law in one focused area. The second benefit
is the realization of economies of scale that result fiom spreading the
costs of certain fixed inputs, such as libraries, accounting, time-recording,
data collection, and word-processing facilities, over a greater number of
lawyers. The third benefit - economies of scope - is derived from joint
production of complementary goods. These savings are based on the
ability of team production of legal services to recycle fixed investments in
human capital, enabling, for instance, a group of lawyers who have
already serviced a client's needs in a particular area to provide additional
services at lower cost than can a competitor who has not had previous
exposure to the client. The fourth, and final, benefit ofjoint production
of legal services accrues from the diversification of investments in human
capital that can be realized when team production of legal services is
coupled with a pooling of earnings." Given the dramatic fluctuations in
the earnings of lawyers corresponding to changes in underlying economic
conditions, lawyers may form teams drawn from diverse specialties, each
specialty being characterized by a different, perhaps even negatively
correlated, elasticity of demand to changes in gross domestic product.
Given these benefits, what comparative advantage does the firm have
over markets in facilitating their realization? By and large, most of the
theories advanced to explain the advantages of the law firm emphasize
the role that it can play in controlling the agency costs that arise naturally
when production of legal services is highly decentralized. Although a
variety of independent theories have been advanced to illuminate this
rationale, given the amenability of agency costs to control through
multiple, overlapping instruments, the most realistic conception of the
law firm is probably best obtained through some combination of different
instruments. These include: (1) centralized monitoring through mechanized time-keeping systems that enable the firm to confer compensation
on lawyers that is commensurate with their level of effort (as measured
in hours worked);l8 (2) conferral of ownership interests in the residual
profit of the firm that can vary from accounting period to accounting
period on the basis of marginal productivity;lg(3) the role of the firm
(particularly firm culture) in creating and maintaining commitments to

17 Gilson and Mnookin, supra note 8. 326
18 F. McChesney 'Team Production, Monitoring, and Profit Sharing in Law Firms:
An Alternative Hypothesis' (1982) 11 J. Lcgal Studies 379
19 Alchian and Demsetz, supra note IS, 786. Fama and Jensen 'Separation of
Ownership and Control' supra note 14, 315-7.

communitarian values that reduce agency costs;P0and (4) the role of the
firm's reputational capital and governance structure in ameliorating the
opportunism spawned by asset-specific investments?'
1x1

Tho phenomenon of rapid law firm growth

k INTRODUCTION

Rapid law firm growth is a phenomenon that has been identified in many
industrialized economies, and Canada is no exception. Of the 48 largest
Canadian law firms in 1990, none had more than 100 lawyers in 1962 o r
and in 1980, only one firm had more than 100 lawyers; but by the end
of 1989, 19 firms had more than 100.22The significance of this growth is
buttressed by comparing the growth rates of the law firms (as measured
by the number of lawyers employed) with the number of lawyers in
private practice in the corresponding provinces. These data are set out
in table 1, and cover three roughly equal periods from 1962 to 1989.
Although yielding equivocal results for the first two periods,PSthe data
are arresting for the most recent period: from 1980 to 1989, save for
Nova Scotia, the growth rate of corporate law firms was far in excess of
the growth rate of lawyers generally. The difference in the rates ranged
from a multiple of 1.7 for British Columbia to a multiple of 3.5 for
Quebec. Similar trends have been exhibited in the United States?'
Galanter and Palay have analyzed the pattern of law firm growth in
the United States, and have found that a kinked exponential function is

20 Daniels, supra note 16
21 Gilson and Mnookin, supra note 8, 367. Galanter and Palay, supra note 5, 775-80
22 These figures are based on data from C a d Law Lirt (Toronto: Canada Law Book,
published annually). The sample of 48 firms was constructed by identifying the
largest law firms in five Canadian aties (Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Montreal,
and Halifax) in 1990, and following the number of lawyers back to 1962.
23 In some cases, the growth rate of firms was considerably greater than the total
number of lawyers; in other cases, the opposite relationship was found.
24 In the United States, for instance, the Nationnl Luw Journal (18 September 1989) has
reported that the number of firms with more than 150 lawyers has increased from
5 in 1970 to 202 in 1989. Of those 202 firms in 1989, 13 had over 500 lawyers,
and 3 had more than 1,000. Further statistics are provided by Gilson and Mnookin,
supra note 8, 314 n3. Rapid growth in the number of American lawyers is
considered by R. Sander and E. Douglass Williams 'Why Are There So Many
lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market' (1989) 14 Law W Social Inquirg 431;
and R Nelson 'Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Structure of Large
l a w Firms' (1981) Am. Bar Found. fis. J. 95. The issue of why the 'mega' law firm
has not developed in the United Kingdom is examined in J. Flood 'Megalaw in
the U.K.: Professionalism or Corporatism? A Preliminary Report' (1989) 64 Indiana
LJ 569.
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TABLE 1
Rates of growth of lawyers in major law firms compared with rates of growth of lawyers
in private practice in the corresponding provinces
Province

1962

1972

1980

1989

330
da

40 1
21.5

903
125.2

1,586
75.6

British Columbia
Lawyers in 12 Vancouver firms
% growth in firms

Total lawyers in province
% growth in province
A lbelta
Lawyers in 7 Calgary firms
% growth in firms

Total lawyers in province
% growth in province
Ontario
Lawyers in 15 Toronto firms
% growth in firms

Total lawyers in province
% growth in province

Quebec
Lawyers in 11 Montreal firms
% growth in firms
Total lawyers in province
% growth in province
Nova Scotia
Lawyers in 3 Halifax firms
% growth in firms

Total lawyers in province
% growth in province

The 48 law firms from 5 major cities chosen for the sample were the largest in each city
in 1990.
Sources: D . k k Stager Lawyers in C a d (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1990) at
146; C a d Law List (Toronto: Canada Law Book, published annually).

a

best fitted with the data ~ollected.'~This exponential function has, they
argue, been operative since 1922, indicating that the size of the large
American firms grew by a constant or increasing percentage each year.

25 Galanter and Palay, supra note 5, 756-65. A kinked exponential hnction means
that law firms grew exponentially before and after 1970, but at different rates.
According to the researchers, endogenous factors explain steady exponential growth,
while exogenous factors explain the increases in the 1970 growth rates.

Canadian law firm growth patterns seem to parallel the American trends.
Although having some anomalous years, the trend in the Canadian data
presented in graph 1, which measures law firm growth in terms of the
aggregate number of partners and associates in 48 firms, shows that
Canadian law firms grew by constant o r increasing rates from 1960 to
1990, indicating that similar forces are at ~ l a y . 5 ~
A second but equally distinctive feature of law firm growth in the last
decade has been its geographical scope. Galanter has commented on the
propensity of large American corporate law firms to grow by opening
offices in cities other than where the firm was originally based:
Twenty years ago the occasional Washington or foreign branch office seemed
anomalous ... But in 1979 o f the twenty largest firms, nineteen had offices in
more than one city ... The mean number of city locations of the twenty largest
firms was five. Of these fifteen had at least one branch overseas?'

Although occurring somewhat later than the trends reported in the
United States, Canadian law firms have also demonstrated growing
geographical dispersion. Tables 2 and 3 depict the frequency with which
offices have been opened in locations outside the city in which the firm
is headquartered. Table 2 lists the new offices of firms opened in other
Canadian cities, and table 3 lists the new offices opened in foreign cities.28
These data exclude mergers of existing firms.29Although the openings
reported in table 2 do not appear significant, the openings shown in
table 3, especially for the last five years, are dramatic: within the last five
years, 14 Canadian firms have opened 18 foreign offices. This compares
with a total of six openings in the 20 years prior to 1985.
In view of the rather pronounced trends observed in law firm growth
- exponential increases in size and recent multi-jurisdictional openings
- any theory of growth must explain both factors. Galanter and Palay
have attempted to explain the former, though not the latter. They argue
that exponential law firm growth can be attributed to the pressures

26 Robust growth is exhibited most starkly by Toronto firms in the last decade; in 7
of the 10 years in the period 1980 to 1990, Toronto law firms grew in excess of
8 per cent per year. For 6 out of 10 Vancouver firms and 5 out of 10 Montreal
firms, comparable growth rates were exhibited.
27 Galanter, supra note 4, 155. See also S. Labaton 'U.S. Law Firms Expand to Reach
Global Clientele' The New York Times 12 May 1988.
28 These data were obtained from a series of newspaper and periodical searches and
were supplemented, where possible, with information obtained from our
interviewing process.
29 This issue is dealt with extensively in section v below.

TABLE 2
New domestic offices
Date

Firm

Head office

New office location

Stikeman Elliot
McMaster Meighen
Martineau Walker
Stikeman Elliot
Ogilvy Renault
Byers Casgrain
Bennett Jones
Bennett Jones
Stikeman Elliot

Montreal
Montreal
Montreal
Montreal
Montreal
Montreal
Calgary
Calgary
Montreal

Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Ottawa
Ottawa
Ottawa
Saskatoon
Ottawa
Vancouver

TABLE 3
New foreian offices
-

Date

---

-

Firm

Head office

New office location

Phillips & Vineberg
Stikeman Elliot
Phillips & Vineberg
Stikeman Elliot
Burnett Duckworth
McMaster Meighen
Stikeman Elliot
Phillips & Vineberg
Bull Housser & Tupper
Blake Cassels & Graydon
Ogilvy Renault
Fasken Martineau Walker
Bull Housser & Tupper
Smith Lyons
McCarthy & McCarthy
Perley-Robertson Panet
Hill & McDougall
Bull Housser & Tupper
Davies Ward & Beck
Faskin Martineau Walker
Bennett Jones
Ladner Downs
Lawson Lundell
Lawson Lundell
MacLeod Dixon

Montreal
Montreal
Montreal
Montreal
Calgary
Montreal
Montreal
Montreal
Vancouver
Toronto
Montreal
Toronto and Montreal
Vancouver
Toronto
Toronto

Paris
London
Hong Kong
Hong Kong
London'
London
New York
New York
Shanghai
London
Paris
London
Hong Kong
Hong
London. England

Ottawa
Vancouver
Toronto
Toronto and Montreal
Cabry
Vancouver
Vancouver
Vancouver
Calgary

Washington, DC
Taipei
London, England
Brussels
Taipei
Hong Kong
Taipei
Hong Kong
Moscow

-

' Closed in 1988
Liaison office

on^^
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produced by the 'promotion to partnership tournament.' They claim that
the promotion of associates to partner status, combined with the desire
of lawyers at partner level to fully exploit their surplus capital, requires
an exponential increase in the size of the firm.50That is, as associates are
promoted, new associates must be hired to fill their positions so that the
surplus capital of senior lawyers continues to be fully leveraged. Thus, so
long as the ratio of partners to associates is kept constant, promotion of
associates to partner status, which is deemed by the researchers to be a
proxy for the attainment of sufficient human capital to create a surplus,
will dictate an exponential increase in the size of the firm.
Apart from their failure to explain the recent pattern of multilocational growth, Galanter and Palay's work suffers from two other
defects. First, by focusing principally on supply-side factors, the argument
neglects unduly the central role of demand-side factors in both stimulating and constraining law firm growth. Despite the desire of lawyers to
leverage fully their human capital, it is clear that they will not be able to
do so in a way that is impervious to market constraints. Should a firm's
client base be affected by a cyclical downturn in the economy or by an
unanticipated adverse shift in consumer preferences, the demand for that
firm's services will, not surprisingly, contract. In this scenario, irrespective
of the leveraging objectives of the firm's partners, only egregious folly
would cause the firm to undertake rapid expansion in an environment
of enervated demand.
A second difficulty with the promotion to partnership analysis turns
on its inability to explain much of the recent merger activity that has occurred among mature law firms in the United States and Canada.=' With
partnership ratios roughly consistent across law firms of similar size,
growth through merger would not appear to confer significant leveraging
gains. Simply stated, a firm of 100 partners and 200 associates will not
experience any gains from a merger with a firm of 50 partners and 100
associates; prior to the merger, the two firms each had a ratio of two
associates for every partner, and this ratio will remain unchanged by the
merger. Unless the ex ante associate-to-partner ratios of merging firms
differ substantially, there is no incentive for firms concerned with underexploited surplus partner reputational capital to engage in this behaviour.
A more rigorous approach to understanding the causes of law firm
growth is predicated on the rather straightforward assumption that

30 Galanter and Palay, supra note 5, 771
31 This increase in merger and affiliation activity is discussed in section v below.

growth is a function of both demand- and supply-side factors. That is, law
firm growth will occur in response to the changing demand for jointly
produced legal services. If, however, as a result of certain exogenous
changes, the law firm can realize certain economies that increase its cost
effectiveness in the delivery of legal services, then the increase can be
expected to stimulate law firm growth. Consistent with this claim, the
discussion following will first consider the demand-side factors and then
the supply-side factors influencing corporate law firm growth.
B. THE DEMAND FOR CORPORATE LAW SERVICES

Over the last decade, the demand for corporate law services has undergone sweeping change. The most notable change in demand has been its
increasing intensity, which has required firms to expand the scale of their
operations. However, at the same time that the intensity of demand has
increased, it has also become much more volatile. The factors underlying
the changes in demand for corporate legal services include: robust
economic growth, growing levels of government intervention, internationalization of the domestic economy, and increased legalization of
corporate activity. Each of these factors will be addressed in turn.

I. Real economic growth
A primary source for increased demand for legal services emanates from
exogenous macroeconomic growth pressures.J2As the economy expands,
an increase in demand for corporate law services can be expected to
follow. For instance, during a period of economic growth and prosperity,
corporations will have greater need for capital to invest in the expansion
of their existing activities. The corporate finance departments of the large
law firms will provide advice and assistance to clients as they try to fund
new projects. While the degree of involvement of the lawyer will vary in
accordance with the form of capital raised (generally greatest with public
equity issues, smallest with respect to routine bank loans), it is clear that
these transactions will increase demand for legal services. And, once the
capital is raised, clients will require further legal assistance in funnelling
the new funds into established or new ventures. Again, the services of the
corporate lawyer, in incorporating new companies and in drafting joint-

32 Support for this proposition can be taken from studies of the American legal

profession. See B.P. Pashigian 'The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the
Demand for and Supply of Lawyers' (1977) 20 J. Law U Econ. 53. Pashigian found
that the quantity of legal services demanded was positively correlated with the level
of gross national product. His proxy for demand was the number of lawyers in
active practice.
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venture, licensing, and franchising agreements, will be required. Once
the economy slackens, and pessimism sinks in, clients will be understandably reluctant to embark on these initiatives, and the demand for corporate law services, with the exception of insolvency and receivership
specialties, will fall off.
Table 4 compares real provincial GDP data with the growth of law
firms in five cities, providing strong support for the putative correlation between growth in demand for legal services as reflected in firm size
and general economic growth. When, as in the post-1981 recession
period, the economies of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia
experienced robust economic growth, law firms located in these provinces
experienced rates of increase that, in most years, matched or exceeded
the real rate of growth in GDP.

2. Growing levels of government inmention
Another factor that has stimulated the demand for corporate law services
is the incremental growth of government intervention in the economies
of Western industrialized nations ever since the inauguration of the New
Deal and the rise of the bureaucratic welfare state." Although it can be
argued that the recent deregulatory wave unleashed by the Reagan and
Thatcher administrations in the United States and Great Britain, respectively, may have curtailed the growth of government intervention, there
are strong reasons for believing that the depth of government intervention may not have been constrained, only its targets." In this respect,
increasing levels of government intervention imply an increase in the
range and depth of laws that affect on the activities of the corporate
sector. As the scope for law increases, the necessity of utilizing the
assistance of legal advisors to respond to these laws heightens.
The importance of legal advice in counselling corporate clients is
accentuated when the reliance of government regulators on 'quasi-law'
is acknowledged.'' In the absence of legislative deliberation and adoption,
the task of identifying the rules surrounding a contemplated course of

33 Interestingly, however, Pashigian's study led him to conclude that the scale of
government regulation was not positively correlated with demand for legal services.
Ibid. 73
34 R. Howse, J.R.S. Prichard, and M.J. Trebilcock 'Smaller or Smarter Government?'
(1990) 40 UTLJ 498.
35 The role of administrative quasi-legislation is discussed by R. Megarry 'Administrative Quasi-Legislation' (1944) 60 Law QR 125. For a recent discussion of the role
of quasi-law in the Canadian securities context. see H. Janisch 'Reregulating the
Regulator: Administrative Structure of Securities Commissions and Ministerial
Responsibility' in Securities Law in the M o d e n Finann'al Marketplace, Special Lectures
of the Law Society of Upper Canada (Toronto: R. deBoo 1989) 97.

TABLE 4
Percentage mowth of lawyers in maior law firmsa compared with percentaKe mowth of CDP in the corresponding provinces
1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a ~ ~ ~ g r o w t h 0.3
Vancouverlawfirmgrowth
2.3

9.4
6.1

4.5
4.9

4.9
9.3

4.3
1.6

5.6
10.4

5.4
9.2

-6.2
12.6

3.4
9.2

2.1
9.5

6.5
9.3

1.5
-0.4

6.4
5.2

5.1
8.0

5.7
7.7

Alberta CDP growth
Calgary law firm growth

6.5
-2.0

7.8
4.7

5.8
9.0

7.1
5.9

9.7
13.4

5.2
13.8

8.5
22.9

-1.8
15.5

-0.2
13.4

1.6
8.1

6.0
11.2

-2.3
6.0

1.7
0.6

6.1
7.3

1.7
3.5

Ontario CDP growth
Toronto law firm growth

0
9.2

5.5
5.4

3.0
0.5

2.3
13.5

2.5
4.9

0.1
7.2

3.2
9.3

-3.7
13.6

5.3
7.7

8.7
6.1

5.1
8.2

4.8
10.1

4.7
12.4

4.4
11.0

2.8
11.4

Quebec GDP growth
Montreal law firm growth

1.1
9.6

4.9
4.5

2.5
11.0

2.2
2.6

4.5
1.5

1.2
11.7

2.2
8.9

-5.4
10.4

2.5
7.8

6.9
8.1

2.6
1.1

2.8
6.5

4.8
5.5

4.5
8.9

2.5
5.3

3.6
12.1

2.9
3.1

2.9
7.5

5.1
2.8

1.5
1.4

3.1
6.7

1.7
8.8

-1.6
5.8

3.5
8.7

7.7
8.0

4.9
4.6

3.0
2.7

0.9
6.0

3.0
4.1

3.8
1.6

Province

Nova Scotia CDP growth
Halifax law firm mowth

Number of lawyers in sample of 48 firms (see table 1)
Sources: GDP data (constant 1986 dollars) obtained from Conference Board of Canada: Online Data. Law firm information derived from data
collected from Canada Law LA (Toronto: Canada Law Book, published annually).

a
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conduct becomes parlous. To clarify what the law is in this setting
necessitates an inquiry that is much more searching and expensive than
would be required in a regime where law is confined to what is technically on the statute books. As Galanter has noted, '[Clorporate client and
mega-lawyer come together in a setting in which there is an immense
proliferation of law and at the same time an increasing awareness of its
indeterminate and problematic character.IS6

3. Zntmnationalizcltion of the domestic economy
A third source stimulating demand for the services of corporate law firms
emanates from changes in the nature of activity occurring in the
corporate sector that are independent of macroeconomic growth cycles.
In large part, these changes reflect the growing 'internationalization' of
the domestic economy. This internationalization is a result of an
unparalleled degree of cooperation effected among the industrial states
during the post-Second World War era. The fruits of this cooperation
are reflected in the diminution of the strength of the various barriers that
have traditionally worked to impede the flow of goods and capital across
international boundaries. For instance, during the period 1947 to 1987,
the worldwide average tariff rates on manufactured goods fell from 40
per cent to between 5 and 6 per cent.s7This has resulted in dramatic
increases in trade. Trebilcock reports that in Canada's case alone, the
level of exports and imports has grown by 564.5 per cent and 552.3 per
cent, respectively, in the period 1947 to 1986.58In the light of the
impending completion of the European internal market, the execution
of the staged implementation of the Canada-United States free trade
agreement and its extension to Mexico, and the revival and integration
of Central and Eastern European countries into the world trading order,
it is possible that the amount of international trade will continue to
expand dramatically within the next decade.
Another barometer of the growing levels of internationalization can be
found in the spectacular increases in international capital flows that have
been observed in the last two decades. The Economic Council of Canada
has found that cross-border trade in existing securities increased 2 1 times
between 1977 and 1988.59Further, the funds raised in international bond

36 Galanter, supra note 4, 161
37 Managing Adjurtmenl: Policies f w Trade-Senritive Industries (Ottawa: Economic Council
of Canada 1988) 1
38 Michael J. Trebilcock 'Freedom of Contract' (draft manuscript on file with the
author)
39 New Frontiers: Intnnalionoliration of Finunciol Marketi (Ottawa: Economic Council of
Canada 1989) 5

markets by all countries were 6 times the amount raised in 1980?O These
trends were also manifested in the amount of international banking
activity. Bryant has reported, for example, that during the 2 1 year period
between 1964 and 1985, international banking activity grew twice as fast
as trade in goods.41
These trends can be presumed to have had important stimulative
effects on the demand for legal services. First, tethered to the relationship
noted earlier between economic expansion and demand for legal services,
liberalization of trade and capital barriers will, in accordance with the
dictates of Riccardian trade theory, be translated into increased economic
growth, which will in turn stimulate demand for legal services. Second,
by definition, the effectuation of economic activity across jurisdictional
boundaries involves greater legal complexity than if the activity were
confined to a domestic context. Corporate actors will not, especially in
discrete, one-time relationships, be familiar with the rights and obligations they have when undertaking conventional commercial activity across
jurisdictions. Mitigation of this uncertainty can be achieved by soliciting
legal advice in the clients' home jurisdiction.
A third effect of internationalization has been the increasing amount
of rationalization activity that it has spurred. In an effort to ready
themselves for more intense international competition, large established
corporations have engaged in a wide range of strategic activities, manifested most clearly in the accelerating amount of merger and acquisition
activity undertaken by Canadian and American corporations in the last
ten years. For instance, Demott reports that in 1985, us firms committed
to 30 merger transactions involving values in excess of $1 billion. In
contrast, she found that only 12 merger-related transactions valued at $1
billion or more took place in the United States between 1969 and 1980.4'
She reports that merger activity has also heightened in Canada in the
same peri0d.4~This claim is confirmed by the data presented in graph 2.
By plotting, against different vertical axes, the number of merger and
acquisition transactions occurring in Canada and the United States between 1960 and 1990, a clear upward trend can be observed. At least
part of the rise in merger activity can be correlated with the increasing
impact of internationalization. If not motivated by the attempt to create
and exploit market power, merger and acquisition activity allows cor-

40 Ibid.
41 R.C. Bryant In$emdionol Financial Intnmedialion (Washington: Brookings Institute
1987) 20-1
42 See, e.g., D. Demott 'Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation' (1987) 65
Wash. U. LQ 69 at 80.
43 Ibid. 81
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GRAPH 2
Mergers and aquisitions (number of deals) in Canada and the United States
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Sources: Mergers and Acquicitions J o u d and Bureau Merger Register

porations to exploit certain synergies and efficiencies of scale and scope
in the production of goods, thereby conferring tangible benefits on
consumers."
These transactions have exerted a profound effect on the nature of
legal services provided in Canada and the United States. Because of the
size of the stakes and the level of complexity involved in merger and
acquisition transactions, any increase in their frequency will increase the
prospect for costly and protracted legal disputes in a wide range of legal
areas. The increasing likelihood of entanglements with the legal system
will, in turn, increase the demand for an extensive array of legal services.
For instance, a given merger or acquisition transaction, whether
motivated by strategic or financial objectives, may require legal expertise
in areas as diverse as securities, tax, antitrust, bankruptcy, labour,
commercial litigation, and intellectual property. In order to economize
on coordination costs, these transactions are best run out of a single law

44 For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see R.J. Daniels 'Don't Shoot the
Messenger: Mergers and Acquisitions and the Public Interest' in L. Waverman (ed.)
Corporate Globolizalion Through Mergers and Acqukilions (Calgary: University of Calgary
Press 1991) 195.

firm. In this vein, merger and acquisition transactions, as well as
increasing the overall demand for legal services, have also affected the
nature of this demand in the direction of multi-specialty providers of
legal service^.'^

4. The Legaliration of corporate activity
A final factor exerting an impact on the demand for corporate legal
services is the legalization of corporate activity. While this trend is
partially reflective of the burgeoning level of governmental regulation in
the economy, it is also reflective of two somewhat related trends: (1)
growing private sector litigiousness; and (2) increased reliance on inhouse counsel. The first factor, growing litigiousness, has been the subject
of considerable scholarly investigation over the past decade?6 For the
most part, this litigiousness has been observed in the context of traditional tort law areas, such as medical malpractice, product liability, motor
vehicle accidents, and embroiling corporations in disputes with various
consumers, often individuals." Surprisingly, however, recent studies have
found that private litigiousness in the tort area is now proliferating into
other areas of law, including conventional commercial and contract law?'
These findings are significant because they imply that resolution of intercorporate disputes is being remitted to the courts, contravening the conventional view espoused by Macaulay that businesses rarely rely on strict

45 During the course of our interviews, a number of small and medium-sized firms
admitted being under considerable pressure to grow in order to accommodate the
demands placed on them by 'mega-transactions.' Without a sufficiently large
foundation, the law firms had considerable difficulty in staffing the broad teams
OF lawyers necessary to conduct these transactions.
46 See, for instance, D. Hensler 'Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute
for Civil Justice's Research' (1987) 48 Ohio Stale LJ 479; G. Priest 'Product Liability
Law and the Accident Rate' in Litan and Winston (eds) Linbilif~:P+ctiue
and Pol+
(Washington: The Brookings Institute 1988) 184; 'The Current Insurance Crisis
and Modern Tort Law' (1987) 96 Yalc LJ 1521.
47 For instance, Priest, supra, at 187 found that product liability filings in US courts
increased from 1,579 in 1974 to 13,595 in 1986 a more than seven-fold increase.
The claim that these statistics are suggestive of an increase in litigiousness has not
gone unchallenged. See M. Galanter 'The Day After the Litigation Explosion' (1986)
46 Matyland LR 3, who argues that, in view of the relatively small percentage of
national litigation filed in federal courts (2 per cent), these statistics are unable to
generate robust predictions respecting national trends.
48 Recent work by Marc Galanter and Joel Rodgers has found dramatic increases in
the amount of contractual litigation: a 223 per cent increase in the number of legal
disputes between the years 1960 and 1988. The increase is attributed to increased
complexity of business transactions and increased competition. See their preliminary
study reported in M. Geyelin 'Feuding Firms Cram Courts, Study Says' Th W d
Street Journnl 3 1 December 1990.

-

168

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL

legal rights and remedies in resolving commercial c~nflicts.'~This
increase in both tort and commercial litigiousness has caused senior
managers to make earlier and more extensive use of legal advice in
corporate decision-making, which further contributes to the demand for
corporate legal services.
The second tictor contributing to the legalization of corporate activity
has been the rise of in-house legal departments in corporation^.^^ For
instance, in the United States, the number of in-house counsel is alleged
to have quadrupled in the twenty-year period between 1962 and 1982P1
Although robust Canadian data are not available, the data presented in
Table 5, showing the total number of lawyers employed by 56 corporations reported in the Canada Law List for the years 1990, 1980, and 1970,
indicate a belated but similar expansionary trend occurring in Canada.
Whereas the total number of lawyers employed by the corporations
included in the Canada Law Z i t increased by only 6.5 per cent from 1970
to 1980, in the following decade the number of lawyers increased by 86.3
per cent. Although the rise of the in-house legal department was
originally envisaged as a way of allowing corporations to reduce their
demand for and cost of legal services (by sourcing legal services at
wholesale rather than retail pricessPand by giving corporations greater

49 Indeed, Galanter and Rodgers, supra, found that the number of intercorporate
contractual disputes increased by 1,112 per cent between 1971 and 1986. The
classic study on corporate litigation patterns is S. Macaulay 'Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study' (1963) 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55.
50 The transformative role of in-house counsel on the nature of legal practice is
documented in k Chayes and k Chayes 'Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law
Firm' (1985) 37 Stan. LR 277; J. Freund 'Comment on Chayes and Chayes' (1985)
37 Stun. LR 301; and R. Rosen 'The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional
Judgment and Organizational Representation' (1989) 64 Indiana LJ 479.
51 J. A y e 'In House Counsel - Better than Ever' Nat. LJ (15 February 1982) at 11.
Chayes and Chayes, supra, at 277 n l , cite a 1983 Arthur Young study of 183
corporate law departments of varying size that showed an average growth of 29 per
cent between 1977 and 1982. This growth has resulted in the creation of some very
large legal departments: according to the Martidah-Hubbell Law Di~eciurvol. 13,
General Electric's legal department had 347 lawyers in 1990.
52 By bringing work in-house, corporations can avoid paying 'retail' prices for types
of work that in-house counsel could produce at 'wholesale' prices. Typically, the
more likely it is that an employer can assure in-house counsel a sufficient volume
of transactions in a given area, the greater the prospect that the lawyer will be able
to develop the expertise necessary to deliver such services at a standard approximating that met by outside counsel. The growing capacity of in-house counsel to meet
rigorous standards of professional competence is also a function of the increasing
prestige that is enjoyed by these lawyers, which has enabled outside counsel to
move to in-house law departments without sustaining any loss in professional
stature. As Rosen has observed, 'inside counsel at major corporations are no longer
depicted as second-rate counsel dependent on the guidance of outside counsel. In-

control over the activities of outside counsel55),things did not turn out as
expected. Rather than tempering demand, corporate counsel have made
senior managers more sensitive to and concerned about the potential for
costly legal entanglements. Insinuation of lawyers into the senior levels
of corporate decision-making has meant that corporate decisions are
increasingly being framed in a way that is sensitive to legal as well as
economic concerns. This framing effect has made managers more anxious
to cover off any potential legal exposure by soliciting formal legal advice.
And, because of the inherent difficulties of in-house counsel in servicing
these needs, possibly because of a perceived lack of expertise or
independence, a non-trivial portion of the demand they induce will spill
over to the private bar."
Nevertheless, in the course of augmenting the demand for corporate
legal services, reliance on in-house counsel has affected the nature of this
demand. In particular, growing use of in-house counsel has increased the
volatility of demand for legal services.55This increase in volatility is
attributable to two factors. First, while in-house counsel have enlarged

side counsel now are characterized as possessing the knowledge and training necessary to handle complex and important legal matters.' Rosen, supra note 50, 483
53 This control is based on the ability of inside counsel to correct some of the endemic
information asymmetry problems that beset the market for corporate law services.
Since, irrespective of the amount of work they do, in-house counsel will receive a
fixed wage from the corporation, they will have little incentive to perform or permit
to be performed services for which the corporation has little real need. As a
consequence, in-house counsel can be expected to play a role in controlling
opportunistic behaviour by outside counsel. By insisting that outside counsel tender
for certain transactions, by scrutinizing the billings of outside counsel, and by
reviewing closely the work of outside counsel, in-house counsel can draw on their
expertise to ensure that the corporation is not overcharged. To the extent that
information asymmetries have, in the past, allowed outside firms to supply services
in an amount or at a price that is in excess of what a fully informed consumer
would desire, the proliferation of in-house counsel can be expected to constrain
such activity.
54 See, for instance, P. Lochner Jr 'Comment (on Chayes and Chayes)' (1985) 37 Stan.
LR 305 at 311: ' m h e existence of in-house counsel is, I believe, expanding the
amount of legal work. Because in-house counsel exist, they observe and become
involved in many areas. Frequently outside assistance is sought
In short, inside
and outside counsel are not fighting over where to split the pie; rather, the pie is
being expanded by inside counsel to the economic and professional benefit of both.'
Contra, however, see Chayes and Chayes, supra note 50, 293, who argue that, as
a result of the rise of in-house counsel, the elite law firm is 'suffering a concomitant
and drastic narrowing of the range of legal work that it performs for the largest,
most powerful corporations on the American economic scene.'
55 The increased riskiness of law firm income flows is commented on by J. Fitzpatrick
'Legal Future Shock: The Role of Large Law Firms by the End of the Century'
(1989) 64 Indiana LJ 461 at 464.
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TABLE 5
Number of in-house counsel
Company
Abitibi Price
Air Canada
Alcan Aluminium Ltd.
Ammo
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.
Bank of Montreal
Bank of Nova Scotia
BCE Inc.
Bell Canada
Bombardier
Canada Post Corporation
Canada Trust
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
Canadian National Railways
Canadian Pacific Forest Products
Canadian Pacific Ltd.
Canadian Pacific Legal Services
Central Guaranty Trust
Chevron
Cominco Ltd.
Dominion Textile Inc.
Domtar
Esso Resources Canada Ltd.
Federal Business Development Bank
General Motors
Great West Life Insurance
IBM Canada
Imperial Oil Ltd.
Imasco Ltd.
Inco Ltd.
Insurance Corporation of BC
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd.
Manitoba Public Insurance Co.
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co.
William Mercer
Molson Companies Ltd.
Molson Breweries of Canada Ltd.
Montreal Trust
National Bank of Canada
National Trust
Noranda Inc.
Northern Telecom Ltd.
Ontario Hydro
Petro Canada Inc.
Placer Dome Inc.
Polysar Ltd.
Royal Bank of Canda
Royal Trustco Ltd.
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TABLE 5 continued
Comvanv

1990

1980

1970

56

56

56

720

455

29 1

32

24

14

423

227

213

Soquij
Stelco Inc.
Sun Life Insurance Co. of Canada
ToronteDominion Bank
Toronto Stock Exchange
TransCanada Pipelines
Xerox Canada
Total companies in sample
Total in-house counsel in sample
Total companies with over 10 lawyers
Total companies listed in Canada l a w Lict

Source: Canada l a w List (Toronto: Canada Law Book, published annually)

the demand for more complex types of outside legal services (transactional advice, for example), they have, by doing some of this work themselves, decreased the demand for other, more routine services traditionally performed by outside counsel.%From the perspective of the law firm,
the shift in traditional counsel work to in-house counsel is disturbing
because the demand for this type of work is extremely stable, varying
only minimally in response to fluctuations in macroeconomic activity.
Without a stable flow of routine legal work, corporate law firms have
become more dependent than ever upon transactional work, which is, by
definition, much more volatile.
The second way in which establishment of in-house legal departments
has contributed to demand volatility emanates from the dilution in or, in
some cases, severance of the mutual reliance relationship that has traditionally existed between outside law firms and their clients?' Because of
the sunk value of investments made by a traditional legal supplier in
assets specific to a particular client relationship,5"and because these assets
are a form of intellectual property that is not easily appropriated, clients
have been historically reluctant to retain different law firms for different
transactions, as this will force them to bear the costs of familiarizing

56 This issue is discussed in Chayes and Chayes, supra note 50, 297 and R Nelson
'Practice and Privilege' supra note 24, 111.
57 See Gilson and Mnookin, supra note 8, 359-60; Nelson, supra note 2, 68.
58 These assets consist mainly of the stock of knowledge that the firm amasses about
the client's internal operating structure, business strategy, financial status, and
personnel.
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newly appointed firms with their needs. Concern over recurring familiarization costs acts as a tax on client shopping that effectively bolsters
the mutual dependence of client and law firm. However, in-house
counsel, by serving as a data bank that can store and convey information
respecting the client's background and legal needs to different outside
counsel, can reduce the magnitude of the exit tax, enabling clients to
shop around for legal advice on a transaction-by-transaction basis.
C. THE SUPPLY OF CORPORATE LEGAL SERVICES

The various demand-side factors enumerated above impact on the law
firm through the mediating force of supply-side factors. That is, while not
wishing to understate the impact of consumer demand in shaping the
nature of the modern law firm, the force of these preferences is
constrained somewhat by limitations that result from exigencies of the
technical production function and from the preferences of suppliers
(lawyers). In this respect, supply-side factors can be viewed as a prism of
sorts, through which images of the law firm have been sharpened and,
in some cases, reshaped.
For the most part, changes in the firm's technical production function
over the last decade have supported the thrust of those demand-side
factors that have 'pulled' on the size of the law firm. These supply
changes have been observed mainly in the form of increased economies
of scale resulting from innovative new technologies that have allowed
firms to automate a range of productive activities at much lower cost than
in the past.59Conventional automation has enabled the firm to reduce the
amount of time that secretaries require to type and copy documents,
enhance the accuracy of internal record- and time-keeping, improve the
firm's research capacity by virtue of advances in legal data bases, and
even confer savings on lawyers in the amount of time and effort that
lawyers must expend on drafting of judicial pleadings and commercial
agreements because of assistance from 'smart' document precedent
systems.60Save for conventional data and word processing systems, most
of these innovations entail high initial fixed costs that do not vary greatly
with the number of actual end users. As such, the per lawyer costs of
these innovations will decline as the number of lawyers in the firm grows,
pushing up the firm's minimum efficient scale.
The other supply-side factor - lawyer preferences - has exerted a

59 See, for instance, E. Warner 'Large Law Firms Moving Toward Automated Office'
21 May 1984, 23.
(1984) Cm-wld
60 Smart precedent manipulation systems will actually custom-tailor documents to
transactions specified by lawyers.

more equivocal effect on the firm. While some commentators have
equated increased size with increased returns to senior partners, this
relationship is not invariably
making at least some lawyers doubt
the strategy of enthusiastically accommodating client demands for
enhanced size. Focusing simply on bottom line economic considerations,
one would expect that apprehension over the prospects of rapid growth
will be exacerbated the greater are concerns respecting increased
volatility of consumer demand, which, in the event of a precipitous
change in economic conditions, could leave senior partners in the
unenviable position of having to support excess capacity (in the form of
idle administrative staff and associate lawyers) by reducing the size of
their partnership draw. An alternative, though a more severe measure,
is for the firm to reduce the size of its obligations to fixed claimants by
simply laying off or firing administrative staff and associate lawyers.
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the instrumental and consumption
value of the firm's status as a mini-society of sorts, in which commitments
to collegiality, cooperation, and community are prized, cost savings
realized through capricious retrenchment may, in the long term, impose
debilitating costs on the firm.62Thus, if the firm is to grow in accordance
with demand-side pressures, other less drastic means must be found to
protect the firm from exogenous shifts in demand.
One obvious mechanism for dealing with such risk is, of course, rooted
in the diversification rationale for the law firm previously d i s c u s ~ e d . ~ ~
That is, by entering into new markets, the firm may be able to diversify
away some of the risk that its human capital will be idled because of
adverse economic conditions. These new markets can be entered by
creating new practice areas that are not as sensitive as the firm's existing
practice to macroeconomic changes.&However, in view of the dearth of
legal specialties having elasticities of demand that are negatively
correlated with existing areas of practice, there will be inherent limitations on the capacity of the firm to diversify away much of the risk of
future income disruptions generated by increased demand by selective
expansion. Consequently, other diversification strategies will have to be

61 While Galanter and Palay, supra note 5, find that increased size is usually
correlated with increased returns to senior partners, they concede that there are
contradictory findings to this claim.
62 These concerns are elaborated on in Daniels, supra note 16.
63 See text following note 30, supra.
64 For instance, a firm specializing in securities law could develop a bankruptcy
practice. Some firms have created these new areas of practice in various non-legal
specialties, such as policy advice and family mediation services.

deployed. One such strategy is to diversify the firm into other jurisdictions having macroeconomic cycles that are not perfectly correlated with
conditions extant in the home jurisdiction. In this respect, expanding
firm size and geographic scope may not be coincidental; geographic
dispersion may be a necessary accompaniment to the enhanced firm size.
IV

T h instruments for growth

A. INTRODUCTION

Having canvassed the reasons for law firm growth, I will now consider
the myriad ways in which law firms can grow. Essentially, the menu of
instruments that a firm can deploy in achieving law firm growth consists
of: standard recruitment and promotion, cherry picking, affiliating, and
merging. A number of different criteria can be invoked to assess the
efficacy of the instruments, including the impact on growth on the firm's
ability to control internal agency c0sts,6~to inculcate and maintain strong
community identificati~n,~~
to preserve firm reputational capital,6' to
diversify away the risks of specialized human ~ a p i t a l and
, ~ to achieve
growth in a timely fashion. The first four of these criteria were generated
from the discussion of the rationale of the law firm developed earlier; the

65 As argued earlier, the law firm form is valued principally for its ability to control the
costs of opportunism that are implicit in arrangements entailing the joint production
of legal services. Control of costs is particularly difficult given the problems in evaluating the contribution of workers to services (which are inherently more amorphous
than physical goods) and the highly decentralized nature of service production.
66 As the size of the firm increases beyond some point, the firm will experience serious
difficulties in maintaining the integrity of its community identity or culture. At one
level, the loss is deeply felt because community culture is a consumption good that
has value in itself. At another level, however, this loss is significant because it
impedes the firm's capacity to control internal agency problems. Cultural erosion
in the large firm stems from the loss of intimacy and collegiality that often
accompanies rapid growth. Consider, for example, the difficulties in transmitting
and maintaining culture in a rapidly growing, 200-person law firm in comparison
with a slowly growing, relatively stable 10-person law firm. Whereas in the latter
case, lawyers will share strong, intimate connections with each other that have been
forged through years, perhaps even decades, of shared professional and personal
successes and disappointments, in the former case, the rate of entry into the firm
is far too high, and the underlying size of the firm is far too large, to be able to
create a reservoir of shared experience dense enough to support the same intensity
and durability of collegial bonds. See Daniels, supra note 16.
67 The preservation of firm reputational capital is another key concern of the firm in
undertaking growth. Uncontrolled growth can dilute investments in firm
reputational capital, which not only imposes economic losses on firm partners, but
also undermines the firm's capacity to control agency costs.
68 The more rapidly the firm grows, especially if growth is concentrated in certain
areas of expertise, the less equipped the firm is to self-insure against the risks of
exogenous economic changes.

last is self-explanatory and is based on pragmatic considerations. In this
section, I will invoke these criteria in an effort to evaluate the comparative strengths and defects of the various instruments available to achieve
law firm growth in local markets. Having done so, I will then consider
whether o r not the arguments developed in the context of local markets
need to be modified when growth is examined in a national o r international setting.
B. THE INSTRUMENTS FOR GROWTH

1. Standard recruitment and promotion

Standard recruitment and promotion is the conventional way in which
law firms achieve growth, and involves direct recruitment of students to
the law firm from prestige law schools, fbllowed by a closely supervised
apprenticeship o r associate period lasting several years that culminates in
promotion of the associate to partnership. The advantage of this
instrument lies in its capacity to differentiate between those individuals
whose personal skills, judgment, and strength of character do and do
not meet the standards of the firm. As soon as it becomes clear that an
associate is in the latter category, she will usually be asked by the firm to
resign. Through this weeding out process, the firm is able to concentrate
its efforts on instilling commitments to the firm's distinctive culture
among those lawyers most likely to assume partner status. This subtle,
though somewhat protracted, acculturation process is prized because of
the support it lends to the firm's role in controlling agency costs and in
preserving culture and reputational capital. In comparison to other
instruments, standard recruitment and promotion provides the strongest
assurance to the principals of the firm that it is promoting the right kind
of lawyers to partner status.
Despite the standard recruitment's strengths in identifying the most
promising lawyers, however, it is not a perfect instrument for growth,
being plagued principally by its extremely cumbersome nature. Because
of the difficulties in transforming human capital, and because of the long
time needed to develop specialist status in a given area, standard
recruitment requires the firm to anticipate labour needs well into the
future. As in any probabilistic forecast, there is always the risk that the
forecast - either through reliance on erroneous information or through
radical changes in expected future states - will be incorrect.69 This

69 The standard work in this area is D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (eds)
Judgmenf under Uncertuinty: Heuristics and Biuses (New York: Cambridge University
Press 1982).
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subjects the firm to the danger that it will have undertaken extensive
investment in lawyers whose skills do not mesh with market demands at
the conclusion of their training.
Another defect with the standard recruitment instrument is its limited
capacity to respond to the needs of clients in areas of practice where the
firm lacks existing expertise. While, in the past, clients having long-term,
stable relationships with firms have been willing to tolerate some amount
of 'learning by doing,' it is not clear that clients will be as accommodating
in the future. In large part, this is attributable to the growing role of inhouse counsel in monitoring law firm behaviour, which has also broadened the scope for comparison shopping. Client insistence that firms have
ready-made expertise in a given area means that gaps in the law firm's
specialized capital will have to be met through other instruments.

2. ~ h e n y ' p x k i nor~lateral hiring
Cherry picking or lateral hiring, the recruitment of seasoned lawyers
from other law firms, addresses the defects found in the standard
recruitment model.'O Unlike the lengthy training periods implicit in the
standard recruitment model, cherry picking enables law firms to respond
much more effectively to the vicissitudes of client demands. A firm experiencing, for example, a surge in the demand for lawyers with specific
skills can quickly meet these demands by recruiting lawyers directly from
the legal labour market. But, like standard recruitment, cherry picking
is not without flaws. In particular, cherry picking requires firms to make
costly and irrevocable ex ante commitments, such as instant partnership,
to recruits without having the benefit of full information. While many of
the observations that are relied upon in the process of lateral hiring are
fairly accurate predictors of technical legal talent (performance in court
or in the negotiation and execution of transactions, the quality of law
review articles, presentations made to professional organizations, law
school transcripts, and so forth), other observations bearing, for instance,
on the recruit's honesty, judgment, and collegiality may be much more
difficult to obtain firsthand, and are therefore subject to error.
An additional difficulty with cherry picking pertains to the role of law
firm culture in shaping and solidifying skills and preferences that are

70 Lateral recruitment has gained considerable popularity over the past decade as an
instrument of growth. See Smith 'National Study: Lateral Hiring Continues
Unabated' (June 1989) 9 Layer Hiring and Training Report 6 . The 1989 survey
reported on found that more than half of the lawyers promoted to partner in the
top 500 American law firms were recruited from other firms. A quarter of the
surveyed firms reported more than half of their associates were hired laterally.

valued by the firm. Because lateral recruits may not have had the lengthy
exposure to the firm ethic through the promotion-to-partnership tournament, there is a significant likelihood that the new recruits will have
commitments to the firm and its culture that are much less powerful
than lawyers recruited directly from law school and then promoted
through the ranks. In these terms, the more reliance that the firm places
on lateral hiring, the greater the danger that it will be torn asunder by
divergent visions of its bedrock values. These internal conflicts are
further exacerbated by the task of integrating lateral hires into the firm
hierarchy. That is to say, to the extent that lateral recruits are able to
exploit market power based on unusually strong demand for their specialized skills, then this can be expected to be reflected in the provision
of benefits from the firm that are more generous than those being
received by other lawyers in the firm having equivalent experience but
hired through the standard recruitment route. For all of these reasons,
one would predict that cherry picking would only be relied upon in those
circumstances where the firm is confident that it can inculcate the
requisite commitment to firm culture in the new recruits, and where the
firm's need for specialist strength is acute.
3. Mergers
Merging involves the integration of two or more existing firms into a
single partnership. Mergers can be effected between two relatively equal
sized firms or between firms of different sizes. Unlike internal growth,
merging allows the immediate realization of scale and scope economies
and ensures that client demands are met with alacrity. And, unlike cherry
picking, merging allows 'acquiring' firms to obtain the expertise of
'target' lawyers without jeopardizing the acquired firm's investment in
reputational capital.
The deficiencies of mergers in a professional setting are, however,
numerous and have received considerable attention in legal trade
journals.'' These deficiencies arise from barriers in achieving the quick
integration of different firms, each of which may have different underlying styles of practice, internal governance mechanisms, compensation
schemes, promotional policies, administrative structures, and marketing
strategies. Integration requires that consensus be achieved on all of these
issues in a fairly narrow time-frame. Given that the human resources

71 See, for instance, N. Blodgett 'Anatomy of a Law Firm Merger' (May 1988) Am. Bar
Assoc. J. 86; W. Bower 'To Merge or Not to Merge' ibid. 94; and L. Collins 'The
Metamorphosis of Merging' (April 1986) 60 Law Imt. J. 304.
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literature indicates that these problems are onerous in the context of
corporate mergers, especially when firms are of relatively equivalent size,
it can be predicted that these problems will be compounded in law firms,
especially with the preponderance of consensus-based governance
mechanisms that implicate more diffused, prolonged, and, often, less
bold decision-making.
Another set of difficulties with the merger instrument arises from the
information problems identified earlier with the lateral recruitment
device. The problems of ascertaining the productivity, ethical mettle, and
collegiality of prospective partners and associates are bound to be
exacerbated in the case of firm mergers, which require firms to evaluate
a much larger group of prospective partners in a much shorter timeframe. Although information problems are mitigated somewhat by the
willingness of firms to open their financial records to prospective
partners, the propensity of law firms to allocate income on bases that
only crudely track current marginal product (resulting, for example,
from optimal ex ante agreements respecting the temporal distribution of
income over a lawyer's lifetime72)means that the capacity of payroll data,
for instance, to cast light on the market performance of future partners
is dulled." And, of course, even if pre-merger investigation could identify
non-performing lawyers in the prospective partner, lawyers in partner
firms may exhibit tied sales properties. That is, owing to the existence of
various hands tying mechanisms, that is, commitments embedded in firm
culture, formalized firm approval processes requiring unanimous appro-

72 Disjunction between current income and marginal product may give rise to
opportunism problems upon the completion of a merger. Since divergence between
current marginal product and income may represent a form of delayed compensation (that is, in order to encourage law firms to make sunk investments in legal
training, lawyers may bond their performance to the firm by taking less than their
current marginal product in the expectation of obtaining more than their marginal
product later), certain constituencies within the successor law firm may use the
opportunity of a merger to renegotiate these compensation agreements. The effect,
for instance, of a renegotiation of the arrangements that govern compensation in
the successor firm that results in the alignment of income and product of senior
lawyers, thereby reducing the draw of senior lawyers, can be seen as a direct wealth
transfer from senior to junior lawyers. Normally, senior lawyers can be expected to
quash efforts aimed at diverting their future draw from the firm. Nevertheless, since
many mergers, by definition, require extensive re-ordering of the affairs of the
merging firms, including the renegotiation of partnership point distributions, it may
be more difficult for senior lawyers to constrain such behaviour.
73 The 'coarseness' of a firm's compensation system in marrying compensation with
marginal productivity is discussed in Gilson and Mnookin, supra note 8, 348 and
S.S. Samuelson 'The Organizational Structure of Law Firms: Lessons From
Management Theory' (1990) 51 Ohio Stale LJ 645 at 651.

val before the merger can proceed, and so forth, firms may present
themselves to prospective partners on a 'take it or leave it' basis, negating
opportunities for prospective partners to 'prune deadwood' from the
ranks of the successor firm prior to the merger. These information and
tied-sales problems increase the prospect that the reputational capital of
the preexisting firms will be diluted by the absorption of lawyers from
merging partners whose work habits and ethical mettle are incompatible
with their individual standards.
Even if firms could be confident, however, that lawyers in their
partner law firms uniformly adhered to minimum standards of professional competence, mergers would stilljeopardize another component of
a law firm's capital investment - its client base. Upon the consummation
of a merger, the new firm will find itself beset by myriad conflicts among
existing clients, which will require that the new firm sever ties with some
of the clients of the pre-existing firms. Although it may be argued that
these conflicts can be resolved through the erection of 'Chinese walls,' it
is not clear that these mechanisms will satisfy either client expectations or
technical legal obligations.'' Picking client survivors is bound to involve

74 Professional regulation provides that lawyers cannot advise or represent both sides
of a dispute and are barred, unless adequate disclosure has been made and consent
obtained, from acting where there is likely to be a conflict of interest. (See, for
example, Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5).
Conflict of interest rules have recently been considered by the Supreme Court of
Canada in the case of MacDonnld Est& v. Martin [1990] 3 SCR 1235. Martin, the
appellant, and the respondent estate were involved in ongoing litigation. Early in
the process, a lawyer had been working on Martin's case at law firm r She later
joined law firm B, which subsequently merged with law firm C. Law firm C,
however, also represented the respondent estate, and the appellant applied for an
order removing the lawyer from law firm c as the respondent's lawyer due to a
conflict of interest. The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously disqualified law
firm c from acting for the respondent, but the court was split 4-3 on the
appropriate test to be applied. Sopinka J, writing for three others, developed a test
that would presume prejudice to the applicant unless the firm (firm C) could show
'clear and convincing' evidence that measures had been taken to prevent disclosure
of confidential information from the 'tainted' lawyer to those members of the firm
who are engaged against her former client. In other words, he would d o w
'Chinese walls' or 'cones of silence,' but only if these devices are approved by the
relevant law society. Mere undertakings and affidavits that the 'tainted' lawyer did
not disclose damaging information are not enough. Cory J, writing for two others,
developed a stricter test. When a lawyer who had substantial involvement in the
matter in question joins the firm acting for the opposing party there will be an
irrebuUablc prcsumptwn that the confidential information has become knowledge to
the new firm. This strict test was justified as being essential to preserve public
confidence in the administration of justice. This principle outweighed any concern
lawyers might have about mobility and the creation of mega-firms. This decision
could have severe repercussions on mergers and affiliations among law firms in
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particularly fractious negotiations, especially considering the necessity of
resolving this issue at the outset of the merger.
This discussion suggests that the merger instrument will be most
efficient when there are clear asymmetries in power between merging
partners prior to the consummation of the merger. In this setting, one
firm will clearly be dominant and its partners will be able to impose their
vision on the other firm, in respect of the variables canvassed above,
without having to engage in the protracted negotiation and consensusbuilding that would be required in the case of mergers involving two
similarly sized firms. In other words, mergers of asymmetrically sized
partners imply the absorption of the acquired firm into the dominant
firm, thereby obviating extensive reconsideration of the firm compact. In
contrast, mergers of equivalently sized partners imply the creation of a
new firm from the combined resources of the two pre-existing firms. In
this case, there is no operative presumption that either of the firm's
characteristics will 'trump' in creating the arrangements that will govern
conduct in the successor firm. Consequently, the need for extensive
negotiation will be increased. Of course, the more compatible firms are
prior to the merger, the less taxing will be the resolution of many of
these is~ues.'~
4. Affiliations
Affiliations are a final route to achieving law firm growth and involve the
effectuation of various strategic linkages between two independent firms.
The substantive content of such affiliation arrangements can vary widely
and depends on the degree of integration sought between participating
firms. On one end of the continuum there are relationships that approximate mergers, while at the other end there are relationships that merely
entail a loose commitment to try to direct work to the other firm in
situations where client demands cannot be effectively serviced within the

Canada. See, for example, J. Saunders 'Court Ruling Signals Tough Stance on
Legal Conflict of Interest' The Glob and Mail Toronto, 11 May 1990. For a more
general discussion of the ethics of conflicts of interest, see M. Kline and D.
Dougherty 'Avoiding Client Conflicts of Interest in an Era of Corporate Change'
(1986) 14 Am. Intelledual Propnt)l Law Rrroc. Q
J 104; and S. Miller and I. Warren
'Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Issues for the Inside and Outside Counsel' (1985)
40 Bus. h u y e r 631.
75 For instance, if the firms have sharply different specialties, the synergies to be
obtained from the merger are increased, while the client conflicts are correspondingly reduced.

referring firm.'6 Between the poles of de facto mergers and loose referral
arrangements are relationships involving more explicit and binding
commitments to refer work of a particularized nature to firm affiliates.
The strengths of the affiliation instrument are obvious. By avoiding
the commitment to full-scale integration, much of the time and expense
implicit in deployment of the merger instrument can be avoided. This
makes the device particularly attractive to firms of relatively equal size.
The defects in growing by affiliation, however, are not trivial. The
flipside of allowing firms to continue to operate as separate institutions
is that the incentive to achieve the gains from increasing the size of the
law firm may be dulled. In the absence of the pooling of receipts, firms
will be understandably reluctant to share valued firm assets with affiliate
firms. Consider, for example, the capacity of affiliated firms to ensure
that work is assigned to individual lawyers solely on the basis of relative
expertise, not on the basis of firm membership. In a fully integrated firm,
lawyers will sustain little, if any, financial penalty for referring work to
other members of the firm. Since a lawyer's income stream is not just a
function of the hours billed on a particular file, there is no reason for a
lawyer to hesitate to refer client work to others within the firm who can
perform tasks more ably than she. Further, there is no penalty at the
firm level from having work referred by firm members to each other;
aggregate billings will not be reduced by such activity. In contrast,
lawyers in affiliated firms will be much more reluctant to refer work to
one another in response to client needs. In the absence of pooled profits,
a referring law firm will not share in the rents accruing from work
performed on a referred client file. Consequently, lawyers will struggle
to hold onto their files, that is, 'hogging,' even if the work can be
performed more expeditiously and competently by members of the affiliated firm. These disincentives will be buttressed by concerns relating
to 'client grabbing' and the fear that the lawyer receiving the referral will
attempt to sell the client services originally being offered by the referring
firm. This concern explains the higher frequency of these types of
affiliation relationships among firms with non-competitive specialties.
A final difficulty with the affiliation mechanism is that it is highly
unstable and prone to relatively early termination by parties. In large
part, the susceptibility of the affiliation to early termination reflects the
lack of tangible investment made by the parties in assets that are specific

76 In local markets, these relationships most often involve firms with very sharply
divergent areas of practice, so that firms can refer work to each other without
having to worry that the firm receiving the referral will attempt to service client
needs in areas where the referring firm has expertise.
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to the relationship. Without asset-specific investment, the parties will have
little incentive to overcome the perverse incentive problems identified
above and to persevere in trying to extract whatever economies can be
realized from the relationship. These asset-specific investments can include the creation of computer networks that can interface among the
partner firms, common data banks, shared client promotion lists, and so
forth.

5. Summary
This discussion suggests that internal growth is the preferable vehicle
for local firm growth in a setting where client needs can be forecast with
confidence and where firms have the necessary expertise to train new
lawyers effectively: it is the device best suited to the preservation of firm
reputational capital. Cherry picking or lateral hiring is probably most
effective in responding to client demands in areas where the firm lacks
the expertise to develop the speciality in-house, or where, owing to particularly intense client preferences, expertise must be acquired quickly.
Merging is probably most effective in situations where there is asymmetrical strength between merging parties, obviating the need for timeconsuming and acrimonious debate on the nature of the firm. Finally, the
affiliation device is likely to be least effective in obtaining the benefits of
growth, at least at a local level. The strains inherent in the relationship
indicate that few of the putative benefits from these relationships are ever
realized. The one exception, perhaps, is those cases where commitments
that the affiliating partners will not 'grab' each other's clients can be
credibly made. These commitments will take the form of agreements to
refrain from developing practice expertise in areas that compete directly
with the affiliating firm.
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF GROWTH IN A NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL S E n I N G FOR INSTRUMENT CHOICE

What impact, if any, does geographic dispersion have on the hierarchy
identified above? One would expect that the difficulties associated would
be intensified. Lack of geographical proximity is bound to increase the
amount of uncertainty that partners have in relation to the other party's
strengths and weaknesses. This distance greatly diminishes the opportunities for pre-merger investigation of a merging firm's professional
excellence, the quality of its client base, and the content of its culture.
These problems are especially acute when the merger instrument is
considered in the context of international mergers. Here, the potential
for serious, perhaps irreparable mistakes is greatest. Because the parties
are not likely to have had the intensive one-on-one contact across all

ranks of the firm, the information problems respecting the quality of
individual prospective partners will be aggravated in comparison to
domestic mergers.
The role of the affiliation device in a multi-jurisdictional setting is
more equivocal, and is a direct function of the degree of overlap that
exists in scope of serviceable markets possessed by affiliate^.^' The higher
the degree of overlap in the markets of the two firms, the stronger will
be the incentives facing the firms to defect from the arrangements by
engaging in the hogging and grabbing activities enumerated earlier. In
other words, as serviceable client markets overlap, firms will reason that
it makes greater economic sense to satisfy a client's needs, rather than
referring work to the affiliate.78
The scope of a single branch firm's legal market is based on the
intersection of two broad considerations: client location and breadth of
expertise. The way in which these combine to determine market size is
illustrated in the standard matrix shown in diagram 1. The axes of the
matrix identify the possible array of combinations of governing law and
client location that can characterize a given transaction. Obviously, single
branch law firms can most effectively service client needs when the client
is located in the home jurisdiction of the firm and where that jurisdiction's laws govern the transaction (quadrant 1). However, once an
extraterritorial element is introduced, in terms of either foreign
governing law or foreign clients, the ability of the single branch firm to
service that transaction becomes somewhat more tenuous. Specifically,
one would expect that the single branch firm's capacity to compete is
least obvious in the case of transactions involving foreign clients and
foreign governing law (quadrant 3), with transactions involving mixtures

77 Law firms in Australia and the United Kingdom have used the affiliation device as
a means of growth. See P. Curtain 'When is a Merger Not a Merger?' (July 1987)
International Financial LR 8, and J. Carr 'Executive Associations: Halfway House or
Cure-All?' (May 1990) Int. Financial LR 11.
78 Owing to the endemic incentive problems discussed earlier, firms will be reluctant
to part readily with client files, even when parts of the file have aspects closely
associated with the jurisdiction in which an affiliate firm is located. Unless assured
that a client referral will be met with a referral of equal or greater value, firms with
non-pooled receipts will reduce to a bare minimum the amount of work that is
referred to lawyers in an affiliate firm. Predictably, the more effectively lawyers
located in the referring firm can service client needs in a jurisdiction containing an
afliliated firm, the less inclined will lawyers be to refer work to the affiliate. In this
vein, see R. Weil 'The Myth of the National Law Firm' Uanuary/Febmary 1981) 7
Ggal Econ. 44: 'What is there to hold together 16 branches of an immigration law
firm? Why should an immigration law practitioner want to send part of his profits
to a home office in Miami? Once regional lawyers are trained in the nuances of the
specialty they are quite capable of proceeding on their own.'
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DIAGRAM 1
Matrix showing possible combinations of client location and governing law
Home client
Home law
Foreign client
Home law

1

2

4

3

Home client
Foreign law
Foreign client
Foreign law

of home and foreign elements (quadrants 2 and 4) somewhere between
these two poles.
There are three basic factors underlying the rankings developed in the
matrix found in diagram 1. The first factor is the presence and magnitude of artificial (governmental or quasi-governmental)entry barriers that
are aimed at limiting the ability of the firm to work on transactions
involving either host state law or host state client^.'^ Generally, entry
barriers focus on the former, although some jurisdictions also attempt to
control the latter. Despite arguments that the rationale for these
restrictions is based on consumer protection goals, the rigidity and
breadth of the restrictions suggest that industry protection goals are just
as important, if not more so. The second factor affecting the breadth of
serviceable markets is the applicability of expertise developed in the
home jurisdiction to transactions governed by the host jurisdiction's legal
system. The more convergent the content of the home and host states'
legal systems, the greater the likelihood that the single branch firm will
be able to opine on legal matters involving the host state's laws. This
factor can also be viewed as a measure of the firm's asset-specific
investment. The third factor influencing market definition is the quantum
of technical production costs?' If, for instance, a transaction involves a
foreign client, then the single branch law firm will incur charges in
communicating with that client in the form of long-distance telephone,

79 See N. Wischnewski 'Free Trade, Eh?' (February 1988) 11 Can. Lawper 11.
80 The explosion in new forms of communications technology renders the geographic
separation between the lawyer and her home base much less significant than in the
past. If computerized, a firm's legal memoranda, legal precedent, and client files
can be instantaneously accessed by lawyers temporarily resident in another
jurisdiction through relatively inexpensive interface technology. Moreover, through
use of commercial data bases, lawyers can use computer technology to access legal
cases and statutory sources. In combination, these new forms of technology greatly
reduce the importance of the client's geographic proximity to the location of a
single branch firm.

computer, and fax charges, and hotel and transportation bills that would
not have arisen were the transaction executed by firms in the host
jurisdiction." However, these additional technical costs may well be
eclipsed by the savings generated by the home firm's expertise, especially
when the transaction implicates laws extant in the home jurisdiction.
When the scope for overlapping markets is considered, the prospect
for durable law firm affiliation arrangements seems least likely in the case
of affiliations among firms in a unitary state, somewhat more likely in the
case of affiliations among firms located in different subnational jurisdictions in a federal state, and most likely in the case of affiliations among
firms in an international setting. Assuming a relatively developed and
cost-efficient telecommunications infrastructure, affiliating firms in the
unitary state are unlikely to be impeded by serious artificial or natural
barriers to practice and therefore will face strong incentives to defect.
In the case of affiliations among firms in federal countries, however, the
presence of artificial and natural entry barriers arising from explicit
action of subnational governments (discriminatory licensing requirements, for example) or from divergences in the content of subnational
legal regimes will constrain the growth of markets of single branch firms,
making affiliation arrangements more attractive and durable. Nevertheless, if a given transaction is governed principally by national laws or by
local laws in which the single branch firm has amassed some familiarity?'
then these impediments become less important, reintroducing destabilizing incentives for defection. Finally, in an international setting, save for
a handful of so-called stateless transactions such as Euromarket financings, the combination of artificial and natural barriers to extraterritorial
provision of legal services would appear to be most formidable, with the
consequence that the scope for market overlap is smallest. This is because
of the combined effect of extremely protectionist entry barriers, highly

8 1 Distinctive technical production costs may also be incurred if the transaction involves
home jurisdiction clients but host jurisdiction laws. In this case, the costs of
production will be raised by the marginal amount of funds expended on
investigating appropriate legal precedents.
82 In the case, for instance, of securities law transactions effected across multiple subnational jurisdictions, the fact that lawyers in large corporate law firms will, of
necessity, have developed a familiarity with the laws extant in all of the subnational
jurisdictions in order to service the normal course needs of clients in their own
jurisdiction mitigates the capacity of these differences to serve as barriers to the
effective provision of legal services. In Canada, for example, it is utterly inconceivable that a securities law practice of any description could be established and
maintained without the lawyers' thorough knowledge of the nuances of each
province's securities regimes. The same is true of many other legal specialties.

divergent legal regimes?' and more expensive technical production costs.
As mentioned above, the creation of rigidly segmented markets makes

affiliation arrangements more likely to survive.
The final form of achieving law firm growth in a multijurisdictional
setting is greenfielding, a variant on lateral recruitment. Greenfielding
is the opening of a branch office in another jurisdiction that is usually
staffed by lawyers recruited from firms operating in the host jurisdiction.
The benefits of greenfielding are obvious. By recruiting lawyers from
firms located in the host jurisdiction, a firm can acquire jurisdictionspecific legal expertise without having to confi-ont the tied-sales problems
present in the merger context. But the downside to legal industry
greenfielding is substantial, and reflects the corrosive force that patchwork assembly of legal teams can have on the capacity of the firm to
transplant its core values and ethic to the branch ofice. If, as is likely,
the lawyers recruited for a greenfield office have deeply ingrained
approaches to legal practice that are incompatible with the culture of the
'acquiring' firm, then the firm's capacity to control agency costs and its
ability to preserve reputational capital will be endangered. These problems may be partially mitigated by transferring a core of lawyers from the
firm's 'head office' to the branch to initiate laterally hired recruits into
the firm's culture.

v T h Canadian experience
A. INTRODUCTION

In this section, I analyze the instruments by which Canadian law firms
have grown in local, national, and international settings. In the main, the
analysis in this section is informed by the results of an extensive set of
interviews that I and two research assistants conducted from July 1989
to September 1990 with senior partners in 40 leading law firms located
in Calgary, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, and Vancouver. Examination of
the instruments deployed by law firms in different contexts provides a
useful case study for the theoretical claims made in the previous two
sections. To the extent that praxis and theory diverge, I offer different
possible hypotheses for this gulf.

83 Although supranational agreements have exerted a harmonizing effect on the laws
of different nations, the content even of the developed countries' legal regimes is
far from uniform. In large part, this divergence in the content of laws reflects
widely varying levels of commitment to the harmonization enterprise.

TABLE 6
Law firm associations
Date

Firms involved

Office locations

Local and regional arsociatiodmcrgers
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1985
1986
1986
1986

Feb. 1989
July 1989
Oct. 1989
1989

Feb. 1990
May 1990

Martineau Walker
Gagnon & Lafeur
Martineau Walker
Lazovitch Cannon & Lemmelin
Cowling & Henderson
Cameron Bruin & Scott
Cassels Brock
Blackwell Law Spratt
Clarkson Tttrault
Drouin et Associes
Osler Hoskin & Harcourt
Herridge Tolmie
Cowling & Henderson
Simmer Harper &Jenkins
Parlee Irving
McLaws & Co.
Lang Michener
Lash Johnston
Cowling & Henderson
Strathy Archibald & Seagram
Stewart MacKeen & Covert
McKelvey MacAulay & Machum
Fasken & Calvin
Campbell Godfrey & Lewtas
Russell & DuMoulin
Lyall McKercher Hanna
Houlden Murdoch & Finlay
Day Wilson Campbell
Stewart MacKeen & Covert
McKelvey MacAulay Machum
Stirling Ryan
Scales Jenkins & McQuaid

Montreal
Montreal
Montreal
Quebec City
Ottawa
Toronto
Toronto
Toronto
Montreal
Quebec City
Toronto
Ottawa
Ottawa
Cambridge & Kitchener
Edmonton
Calgary
Toronto
Toronto
Ottawa
Toronto
Halifax
Saint John (NB)
Toron to
Toronto
Vancouver
Vancouver
Toronto
Toronto
Halifax
Saint John (NB)
St. John's
Charlottetown

National associotions/mergers
1976
1981
1985
1986
1987

Sept. 1988

Martineau Walker
Stapels Sewell
McCarthy & McCarthy
Black & Co.
McCarthy & McCarthy
Shrum Liddle Hebenton
Fasken & Calvin
Martineau Walker
Goodman & Goodman
Phillips & Vineberg
Goodman & Carr
Lapointe Rosenstein

Montreal
Toronto
Toronto
Calgary
Toronto
Vancouver
Toronto
Montreal
Toronto
Montreal
Toronto
Montreal

Size
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TABLE 6 continued
Date

Firms involved

Ofice locations

Size

Apr. 1989

Borden & Elliot
Howard Mackie
Blake Cassels & Graydon
Jordan Gaul & Storrow
Blake Cassels & Graydon
Duncan Collins
Osler Hoskin & Harcourt
Ogilvy Renault
Lang Michener Lash Johnston
Lawrence & Shaw
Goodman & Goodman
Phillips & Vineberg
Freeman & Co.
Bennett Jones
Verchere Noel & Eddy
McMillan Binch
Bull Housser & Tupper
Byers Casgrain
Tory Tory
Desjardins Ducharme
Lawson Lundell
McCarthy & McCarthy
Clarkson Tetrault
Goodman & Carr
Lapointe Rosenstein
Ferguson Gifford
Fraser & Beatty
Mawhinney & Kellough
Fasken Martineau Walker
Davis & Co.
Aird & Berlis
Boughton Peterson
Borden & Elliot
Russell DuMoulin
Howard Mackie
Mackenzie Gervais
Osler Hoskin & Harcourt
Ladner Downs

Toronto
Calgary
Toronto
Vancouver
Toronto

162
72
250
9
250
25
240
140
117
47
52
48
48
116
22
102
109
46
129
76
62
340
100
105
45
44
185
25
n/a
85
68
41
203
165
75
55
164
288

Apr. 1989
May 1989
May 1989
June 1989
July 1989
Nov. 1989
Nov. 1989
Dec. 1989
Jan. 1990
Feb. 1990
Apr. 1990
1990

June 1990
Oct. 1990

Oct. 1990

cakarY

Toronto
Montreal
Toronto
Vancouver
Toronto
Montreal
Vancouver
Calgary
Montreal and Toronto
Toronto
Vancouver
Montreal
Toronto
Montreal
Vancouver
Toronto
Montreal
Toronto
Montreal
Vancouver
Toronto
Vancouver
Toronto and Montreal
Vancouver
Toronto
Vancouver
Toronto
Vancouver
Calgary
Montreal
Toronto
Vancouver

+

Source: This data was drawn from announcements in the Globe and Mail and interviews with
representatives from the law firms involved.

B. THE LOCAL CONTEXT

I n table 6, the frequency of merger and affiliation activity among
approximately 60 firms in both local and national contexts is examined.
Viewed as a whole, these data show that the level of merger and
affiliation activity among Canadian law firms has increased over the last
five years. Yet deipite global increases in merger and affiliation activity,
local mergers and affiliations did not appear to be terribly significant

forces in explaining local growth." While in 1984 there was only one
local merger involving 61 lawyers, by 1989 the total number of local
mergers had only increased to 3 involving more than 589 lawyers. The
handful of mergers that did occur during this time were the subject of
considerable debate in the legal community. Although lawyers in the
firms involved in these local mergers cited the realization of synergies as
the motivation for the mergers - most frequently in the form of manying
complementary corporate/commercial and litigation expertise - their
competitors were dubious of the strength of these synergies. And, among
both participating firms and competitors, concern was frequently
expressed over the capacity of the merging parties to wrest synergistic
benefits from the mergers given innate differences in the culture of the
merging firms.85An interesting and not infrequently identified factor
motivating local mergers among firms outside Toronto was preparation
for mergers or affiliations with Toronto firms. That is, recognizing the
inevitability of mergers with Toronto firms, some firms in Vancouver
and Montreal admitted that they had proposed mergers with other local
firms in an effort to 'bulk up' or strengthen their numbers so that in the
event that the firm remained independent, it would be able to compete
more effectively with Toronto firms or, alternatively, in the event that the
firm decided to merge or affiliate with a Toronto firm, it would have
greater bargaining power to safeguard its interests when negotiating
professional autonomy, style of practice, or compensation issues.86It is
nevertheless significant that mergers proposed along these lines rarely
moved beyond the embryonic stage to actual execution.
C. THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

1. Overoim

Table 6 also shows the pattern of merger and affiliation activity carried
out nationally over the last five years. Between 1985 and 1987, there
were 3 mergers affecting 468 lawyers, but by 1989, there were 9 mergers
involving 1872 lawyers. Despite the fact that in absolute terms the
number of national mergers and affiliations is relatively small, their

84 Instead of mergers or affiliations, most local growth has been achieved by way of
internal growth and cherry picking.
85 This point is elaborated on at length in Daniels, supra note 16.
86 Interestingly, in recent months, some Toronto practitioners have begun to
contemplate, perhaps only superficially, the prospect of a merger with another
Toronto firm in order to 'bulk up' in preparation for the mass entry of foreign
(that is, American) firms into the Canadian market.
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significance should not be underestimated given the highly concentrated
nature of the Canadian legal community. Indeed, by 1991 the pool of
potential affiliation partners among the major Canadian law firms had
dwindled dramatically, leaving only about 20 unhitched major law firms
in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver.
The triumph of national mergers and affiliations poses some very
troubling questions for the analysis developed in the last two sections.
First, in terms of the rationale underlying national growth, the demand
and supply trends canvassed in section 111 do not appear supportive of
growth along this axis. On the demand side, there was little evidence
indicating a massive increase in the amount of interprovincial commercial activity over the last decade. In fact, to the extent that practitioners
raised this factor at all, they were firmly of the view that interprovincial
barriers to the mobility of factors and goods had grown in importance,
thereby diminishing the capacity of Canadian business to undertake
national activity. On the supply side, burgeoning rates of innovation in
the technology of the law firm (fax machines and computerized data
bases, for example) appear to make it less rather than more expensive
for practitioners to service clients on a pan-national basis out of a single
office. In these terms, it would seem that so long as lawyers were willing
to live out of a suitcase for some time, the single branch office would
suffice as a means of organizing national legal activity.
Even more perplexing than the existence of growth along national
lines was the instrument chosen to accommodate this growth. Despite
vagaries in nomenclature, most of the associations consummated among
Canadian firms turned out to be based on the affiliation model. That is,
even firms claiming to have 'merged' or to have created 'national
partnerships' used separate profit centres and appeared to have engaged
in little, if any, smoothing of incomes between cities. In view of the
relatively trivial entry barriers operating against Canadian law firms in a
national setting, the theory propounded in section IV suggests a different
array of growth instruments, with greenfielding and merging being the
most desirable options.
In the following parts, the nature of national affiliation arrangements
will be explored in greater detail, and I will then try to address the
related issues of why firms have decided to grow nationally and why they
have consistently favoured the affiliation device.

2. The affdiution arrangement explored
Why have law firms favoured the relatively loose set of ties, particularly the non-integrated profit pooling, implied by the affiliation model?
The reasons given for this reluctance varied from firm to firm. While
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partners in some firms claimed that profit sharing was not necessary to
the survival of an affiliation arrangement, partners in other firms
conceded that financial pooling would be 'logical' and 'desirable,' but that
practical difficulties, such as intense disagreement over the form of
financial distribution arrangements, intervened to thwart implementation
of more ambitious integration schemes. Particularly difficult to resolve
was the issue of whether professional incomes for all lawyers in the
affiliated firms should, irrespective of the actual location of practice, be
calculated solely on merit and seniority principle^.^' To the extent that
evidence of profit sharing was observed in the affiliation arrangements,
it was typically concentrated on the firms' international partnership
activities, which were organized as a separate profit pool. Yet, despite the
lack of integrated profit pooling, most affiliation arrangements did
involve some level of rationalization. Many of the firms were jointly
developing computerized accounting and record-keeping systems, while
some even professed to be developing common marketing strategies in
both domestic and international markets.
At the heart of national affiliation arrangements was commitment to
refer work to lawyers in affiliated firms on the basis of established
criteria. However, these commitments were by no means uniform across
different firm affiliations, varying greatly in terms of the depth and scope
of the referral obligation. Most of the lawyers interviewed emphasized
that the agreements were quite amorphous, and that their force relied
much more on a spirit of good will and decency than on technical legal
obligations. As evidence of the amorphousness of their obligations under
affiliation agreements, most lawyers in affiliated relationships claimed that
no clear rules were specified as to when a firm was required or expected
to turn over a file to an affiliate. The potential for such broadly drafted
agreements to spawn serious confusion and disappointment is underscored by the starkly different interpretations that different firms in the

87 Since, at the time that the interviews were conducted, there was a substantial dif-

ferential between the income earned by Toronto lawyers in comparison to lawyers
in other parts of the country, Toronto lawyen were understandably reluctant to
argue for uniform income policies, and lawyen outside Toronto in affiliated firms
held out little hope that such policies would be adopted. (The 1990 annual lawyers'
survey in Canodiun L a y found that Toronto partners called to the bar between
1985 and 1989 earned an average of $152,000, while lawyers in Calgary, Montreal,
and Vancouver earned $84,750, $126,250, and $111,250, respectively. See (June
199 1) Canodiun Lawyer 18.
88 Although many firms understood their affiliation responsibilities as requiring them

to ensure that all work being referred to firms located in an affiliate firm's
jurisdiction be funnelled to the affiliate, the issue of when work would be referred
in the first place was largely discretionary, and left considerable scope for hogging.

same affiliation arrangement gave to their obligations under the agreement. In more than one instance, firms in one jurisdiction envisaged
their referral commitments pursuant to the affiliation agreement to be far
less onerous than their partners did who were located in other jurisdictions.
Similar confusion was encountered among and within various affiliation groups respecting the treatment and resolution of client conflicts.
While some lawyers felt that the affiliation structure created serious conflicts of interest among the participating firms that were in need of
urgent resolution, other lawyers felt that the affiliation structure offered
participating firms sufficient independence to obviate any concern over
conflict^.'^ This divergence in approaches to conflicts masked the substantial similarity in the underlying structure of the various arrangements.
Another common feature of these arrangements was the constancy of
the originating cities of the firms participating in affiliations - national
affiliations rarely departed from a tripartite model, wherein participation
was confined to law firms based in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver.
Although some affiliations included participation of firms located in
Calgary or Ottawa, by and large these were e x c e p t i ~ n a l .We
~ ~ were
unable to find evidence of any affiliations among firms in the Maritimes
with firms in Central and Western Canada.g' When Calgary or Ottawa
lawyers were asked why they were not privy to these arrangements, most
indicated that the economies of their provinces were too regional in
character to justify inclusion. According to these lawyers, regional
concentration of economic activity in Alberta and Northeastern Ontario
diminished the incentive for firms located in Toronto, Montreal, or
Vancouver to affiliate with firms in Calgary or Ottawa because clients in
both of these areas had little commercial interaction with each other.
Consequently, affiliations among these firms would yield only marginal
economic benefits to consumers of legal services.= In this respect, the

89 In Australia, reliance on the affiliation model is partially explained by its putative
ability to avoid having to address issues of client conflict. See Curtain 'When Is a
Merger Not a Merger?' supra note 77, 10.
90 See table 6.
91 There is, however, evidence of affiliation activity concentrated on the East Coast of
Canada. The law firm Stewart McKelvey Stirling Scales, created by a number of
mergers, has offices in Charlottetown, Halifax, Sydney, Saint John, Moncton, and St.
John's.
92 This was especially true for Calgary, where most of the legal work is tied to the
foreign-controlled oil and gas industry, leaving the industry less dependent on

lack of significant national affiliation or merger activity outside the
Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver axis confirms the inability of supplyside factors to vindicate law firm growth objectives in a way that is
oblivious to demand-side considerations. Were supply-side factors alone
able to determine the growth pattern of law firms, then one would expect
to find much greater levels of affiliation activity between central Canadian
law firms and Calgary firms because of the benefits to internal income
diversification goals when participating firms are located in relatively
distinct regional economies.
Another arresting feature of national affiliation arrangements is that
they often serve as the foundation upon which international activities of
the participating firms are based.93That is, pursuant to the affiliation
agreement, firms have agreed to support the creation and/or maintenance of international offices representing the affiliating firms. Most of
the lawyers interviewed attributed the inclusion of commitments
respecting foreign offices in the affiliation package to the daunting
character of the investment required to launch these offices. Given both
the highly speculative nature of these offices and the onerous start-up
and maintenance costs of a foreign office (often in excess of $1 million
annually), most firms were anxious to diversify some of the risk of these
ventures, and the affiliation arrangement provided a useful device.
In view of the ambiguity inherent in many of the terms of the affiliation agreements, virtually all affiliated firms have understood the importance of establishing a governance mechanism to sort out and reconcile many of the conflicts that are destined to arise between the firms.
Accordingly, steering or coordinating committees have been created that
consist of one or two senior partners from each affiliating firm and that
are charged with the dual tasks of easing the transition from independent
to affiliated firms and of resolving conflicts among the affiliates. At the
time that the interviews were conducted, most of the steering committees
were preoccupied with transitions issues, such as inculcating commitments to the affiliation venture among lawyers in the constituent firms,
and had given only cursory attention to conflicts problems. So seriously
was the goal of integration being pursued that national retreats for the

domestically generated pools of capital or on cooperative enterprise with firms in
other Canadian industries.
93 One exception, however, is the international partnership of Osler Hoskin &
Harcourt (Toronto), Ogilvy Renault (Montreal), and Ladner Downs (Vancouver).
These firms have not entered into any national affiliation arrangement, and
presumably this reflects concern over losses in referrals from unaffiliated firms
across Canada and concern over client conflicts of interest.
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entire partnership were being orchestrated, as well as the formation of
national practice groups in certain legal specialties.
A final characteristic of national affiliations was the relatively abbreviated time-frame in which they were consummated. Although the linkage between McCarthy & McCarthy and Black & Company was concluded as early as 1981, relatively few national linkages were created until
1989. In large part, the reason for this delay resides in the role played
by interprovincial barriers in suppressing the creation of national law
firms.%While the putative benefits of national law firms may have existed
for some time, firms were unable to exploit these benefits because of restrictions imposed by provincial law societies on the creation of such linkages. However, once the Supreme Court of Canada lent its imprimatur
to national law firms in the Black decision, there was no serious legal
impediment and firms were free to consummate these arrangements?'
3. Alternative explanationsfor national affiliation activity
Some light can be cast on the decision of Canadian law firms to undertake national growth and to do so via the affiliation device by considering
several different factors: (a) information asymmetries between producers
and consumers of legal services; (b) external limitations on the form of
organization; (c) efficient pre-merger search activity; and (d) destabilized
referral arrangements ('rat race' explanation).

a. Informution asymmetries between producers and consuws of legal services.
One possible factor explaining the rise of national affiliations is exploitation-of-consumer-ignorance by legal suppliers. The exploitation of
consumer ignorance story runs as follows. The market for legal services
is plagued by endemic information asymmetries that favour lawyers.
Although national affiliation activity yields little if any tangible benefit to
consumers, it does confer benefits on some lawyers. These benefits come
in the form of psychological satisfaction from firm expansionwand in the

94 These barriers take the form of various provincial law society restrictions on the
capacity of lawyers called in one province to practice in another. See B. Filipow Jr
'Getting National Mobility in Motion' (September 1982) 6 7 C a d i a n Lawyer 45.
Similar restrictions have, in the past, impeded the movement of law firms within
the United States: see, for instance, P.C. Beck 'Why Large Firms Have Not
Incorporated' (1971-72) 12 Law Off.Econ. Mgmt. 516.
95 Law Sociely of Alberta v. B h k et nl. (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 317
96 There is a long line of analysis in the management literature dealing with the
propensity of corporate managers to favour growth, that is, empire-building goals
over profit objectives. See, for instance, W. Baumol Business Behavior, Value and
Growth (New York: MacMillan 1959); R. Marris Tlu Economic Tluory of 'Managed'

form of various perquisites of office.97That is, by mouthing the mantra
of 'synergies,' 'economies of scale,' or 'rationalized production,' firms
were able to fool unsuspecting consumers into bearing the various
pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs entailed by affiliation activity.98
At a theoretical level, there are strong reasons for rejecting the sinister
story of deliberate exploitation of consumer ignorance as a valid
explanation for national affiliation activity. To start, fairly sophisticated
corporate clients would be unlikely to suffer the afflictions of more costly
law firm structures without some degree of compensating benefit. The
claim that clever marketing will lend a veneer of legitimacy to what is an
otherwise economically valueless range of activities seems implausible,
especially when the monitoring role of in-house counsel is considered.''
To the extent that these relationships are bereft of economic value, then,
providing there are no insuperable barriers to client m~vement,'~"
competitor law firms not burdened with these relationships should be
able to lure clients away. Further, given the consensus-based management
structures employed in most firms, it is unlikely that a core group of
partners would be able to appropriate a disproportionate share of nonpecuniary benefits from worthless affiliation activity without raising the
ire of their colleagues. For all these reasons, theory would suggest a
heavy discount of the sinister explanation.'O1

97

98
99

100
101

Capikdism (New York: Free Press of Glencoe 1964); and 0. Williamson 'Managerial
Discretion and Business Behavior' (1963) 53 Am. Ecm. Rev. 1032 at 1033-4.
Lawyers in some firms, pointing to the variety of 'perks' that accompany such
affiliations, for example, frequent trips, national partner retreats, and relief from
client servicing duties, alleged that the only real beneficiaries of the trend were
senior partners in the affiliating firms. Of course, under this hypothesis, those
exploited in the national affiliation wave include not only the clients of these
partnerships, but their partners and associates as well.
However, at least a few firms acknowledged that filiation arrangements yielded
some 'slight psychological benefits.'
One corporate counsel interviewed during the course of our study said that upon
being informed by his corporation's Toronto law firm that they had concluded an
affiliation with firms in Vancouver and Montreal, he responded by wishing them the
best of luck in their venture and instructed them to continue to refer all work
requiring counsel in either Quebec or British Columbia to the outside law firms that
the corporation regularly used in these jurisdictions, which were not, of course, the
firms that the Toronto firm had affiliated with. Nevertheless, the fact that at least some
national filiations occurred between firms that had traditionally serviced the needs
of the same large national client, for example, one of the five major Canadian banks,
suggests that outside counsel will be supportive of the creation of some affiliation
groups.
That is, client-specific investments made by the firm.
A more benign variant of the asymmetrical information hypothesis turns on the
vulnerability of lawyers to perverse client and supplier demands. That is, a number
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One troubling feature, however, of the outright rejection of the
sinister explanation was the frequency and vehemence with which lawyers
both in affiliating and non-affiliating firms argued that affiliations were
bereft of economic value. Substantiating these claims was the admission
made by lawyers in most affiliatingfirms that the amount of referral work
from firms in other cities remained the same after the affiliation as
before, although the balance between work derived from affiliates and
non-affiliates had clearly shifted in favour of the former. If true, this
evidence provides some support for the theoretical claim developed
previously that argues against the affiliation form of organization in a
national setting, implying that the force of consumer resistance will
unravel these arrangements. Nevertheless, as my survey was undertaken
at a relatively early point in these affiliation arrangements, it may be
premature to reject the value of national affiliations.
b. External limitations on the form of organizution. A more plausible
explanation for the form and timing of national affiliations focuses on the

of law firms, even several of those actually consummating a national affiliation, readily
admitted that there was little benefit from affiliation activity, that affiliations were all
'smoke and mirrors,' but that some clients were insistent about being serviced by firms
having national affiliations.These concerns were expressed most frequently by foreign
clients in relation to work to be performed by Vancouver and, to a lesser degree,
Montreal firms. The reasons for these preferences are somewhat mysterious. Given an
existing set of informal but effective referral arrangements, there appears to be little
basis for foreign clients to worry about the capacity of a non-affiliated firm to render
competent legal services in respect of a transnational transaction. (Perhaps these fears
can be related to exaggerated external concern over the fragmentation of the Canadian
economic union.) Perverse preferences in favour of affiliation activity were also
reported to emanate from graduating law students. In particular, unaffiliated law firms
found that their recruitment efforts, particularly during the years of heightened law
firm affiliation activity in 1988 and 1989, were impeded by the lack of national
linkages. If accurate, the premium placed on national linkages by law students is
somewhat puzzling. Given that few, if any, firms consummating these linkages held out
the prospect of increased interjurisdictional mobility as being an important motivating
rationale, it is unlikely that students are attracted to these firms for the prospect of
travel benefits. And, given the ambiguity that surrounds these arrangements in the first
instance, it is unlikely that the presence or absence of national linkages is an effective
signal of firm quality. Despite the fact that the preferences of both clients and
prospective lawyers may be perverse, the existence of such pressures does exert an
undeniable impact on firms. The question is, of course, how firms react to these
pressures. One strategy is to try to make both consumers and students aware of the
flimsy foundation upon which their expectations respecting national linkages are based.
But, in the event that non-affiliated firms are unable to credibly convey this point, an
alternative strategy is simply to capitulate to the dictates of the market. In these terms,
the effectuation of a loosely conceived national linkage may be the most cost effective
way to satisfy market fads and fashions.

role that professional self-regulatory agencies, such as the provincial law
societies, have played in limiting the ability of lawyers to finance new
initiatives. The two most important restrictions are prohibitions on the
ownership of shares by non-lawyers and the lack oflimited liability.lo4The
deprivation of these share attributes effectively bars Canadian law firms
from raising capital by the sale of equity shares to the general public. As
a consequence, law firms are required to resort to bank borrowing to
raise new capital. Yet, given the lack of tangible physical assets owned by
the firm and the impediments to enforcing specific performance of claims
on human capital, the security that can be offered to banks is quite
limited. Historically, these restrictions were not onerous, but it can be
argued that they have recently become much more debilitating.I0' In
large measure, this is attributable to the demands placed on Canadian
law firms to open offices in foreign jurisdictions. These offices involve
considerable expense and effort, and offer only uncertain reward. They
are, by far, among the most risky marketing ventures ever undertaken
by Canadian law firms. One way of coping with restrictions on the sale
of equity to specialized risk bearers is to spread the costs of these
ventures over more lawyers. This is, in fact, one of the characteristics of
the national affiliation: the joint sharing of the development costs of
foreign offices. Perhaps the joint sharing of the development costs of
computer software, and so forth, can also be explained in these terms.
If accurate, the clear implication of this factor is that it may be time to
rethink the efficacy of restricting the ability of large law firms to access
equity markets through the sale of limited liability shares.lMBy allowing
law firms to sell equity stakes, the risk of foreign market failure may be
shifted to parties having a comparative advantage in risk bearing. Some
may object to this prospect on the grounds that the extension of limited
liability to non-professional owners would attenuate some of the desirable

102 The various restrictions on the law firm form that are imposed by various
regulations are described and evaluated by Prichard, supra note 7.
103 Ibid. Prichard presciently observed that, although the capital needs of law firms in
the late 1970s were sufficiently modest that they could be satisfied by the current
partnership structure of the firm, this would not always necessarily be so, especially
in view of the possibility that delivery of legal services in Canada will be effected
by way of multi-province, multi-office firms.
104 An argument - on different grounds - against reliance on the worker-owned firm
model as the exclusive method of delivering legal services has been recently made
by H. Hansmann 'When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy' (1990) 99 Yak LJ 1749. Hansmann
claims that the internal costs of governance in non-homogeneous workforces are
sufficiently large as to render worker-owned firms less efficient modes of
organization.
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monitoring properties instilled by the restriction. However, to the extent
that professional responsibility concerns are implicated, they should be
addressed through a variety of more finely honed instruments that
specify standards of conduct in a clearer form.'05 Indeed, one suspects
that the benefits from subjecting law firms to the discipline of having to
detail and justify their expansion plans to outside investors, when
combined with the diminished risk of financial distress faced by lawyers
if they can shift some of the risk to outside investors, will clearly inure to
the benefit of consumers.

c. Efficient search activity. One way of explaining the preponderance of
affiliation-type arrangements is to readily acknowledge their imperfections, but to argue that they are merely transitory arrangements that are
precursors to more integrated mergers. According to this argument, the
risks of large-scale mistakes when mergers in different cities are effected
has caused law firms to enter into arrangements that furnish an
opportunity for structured interaction over a prescribed time period, with
the option to escalate the arrangement to a full merger should both
parties be confident that the issues involved in a merger can be satisfactorily resolved. As a number of firms pointed out, these arrangements are
akin to 'living together before marriage.'Io6In this vein, these agreements
stand as an institutionalized form of search activity.'07
The characteristics of these affiliation agreements are highly conducive
to the type of search process that is necessary to assuage the fears of law
firms about the effects of a contemplated merger. The fact that a core
feature of these agreements is a commitment to refrain from negotiating
o r creating voluntary professional linkages with other law firms reinforces
the validity of this claim. Further, the frequent interactions planned for

105 See John Quinn 'Multidisciplinary Legal Services and Preventative Regulation' in
Evans and Trebilcock (eds) supra note 7, 329. Quinn argues that concerns over
dilution of professional independence of lawyers does not provide a justification for
the broad scope of existing prohibitions on equity participation by non-lawyers. An
American proposal to modify the structure of the partnership model of the firm in
a way that is sensitive to consumer needs has been advanced by Stephen Kalish
'Lawyer Liability and Incorporation of the Law Firm: A Compromise Model
Providing Lawyer-Owners with Limited Liability and Imposing Broad Vicarious
Liability on Some Lawyer-Employees' (1987) 29 Ariwnu LR 563.
106 Another metaphor frequently relied upon in explaining these arrangements was that
filiations provided firms the opportunity to create a bare structure and then slowly
'put meat on the bone.'
107 The search rationale has been implicitly invoked by four afliliating Australian firms:
see C. Brennan 'Four-City Merger Generates New Work and New Ideas' (January1
February 1985) 59 Law Insf. J. 84.

members of the law firms, in terms of national specialist practice groups
and national partner retreats, would give law firms frequent and valuable
opportunities to assess the quality of their prospective partners. In this
vein, many lawyers argued as follows: because the firms have not
integrated their profit centres and, in most cases, have even refrained
from changing their local names,'08 in the event that the parties decide
that a merger is not appropriate, the affiliation arrangement can be
reversed without incurring burdensome resource or reputational costs.

d. Destabilized referral arrangements. A final explanation for the wave of
affiliations turns on the destabilized referral arrangements that followed
in the wake of the first set of national afiliations. Frequently during the
course of the interview process, lawyers would comment on the increasing levels of economic power and, hence, legal activity concentrated in
Toronto. Virtually every firm interviewed outside Toronto commented
on the centripetal forces at play in Canada, which have effected a massive
transfer of economic power and, hence, legal work to T ~ r o n t o . ' "In
~
Montreal, many of the firms commented on the devastating effect of the
exodus of banks and insurance companies to Toronto following the
election of the Parti QuCbCcois government in 1976. To some extent, this
flight of capital has been recently tempered by the rise of strong
indigenous financial institutions such as the Caisse de dCpGt et placement
du Quebec and Le Mouvement des caisses populaires Desjardins.
Nevertheless, many of the firms stated that, for all intents and purposes,
'Toronto was calling the shots.' In Calgary, the era of cheap oil and the
widely condemned national energy policy were ascribed with responsibility for the shift in economic power to Toronto. Finally, in Vancouver,
the wave of consolidations in the forestry and resources industry, and the
acquisition of these companies by the leading Canadian families located
in Central Canada, were viewed as the source of Toronto's growing
domination.
The consequence of this shift for law firms outside Toronto was
devastating. Lawyers in many of the non-Toronto firms reported an
alarming decline in billings. Lawyers in other non-Toronto firms stated

108 That is, affiliating firms retained their local names and then created a name for the
national affiliation group, which would be identified on each member firm's
letterhead.
109 Toronto's domination was replicated in the afliliation arrangements concluded
between Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver firms. Many firms likened this tripartite
model to a 'hub and spoke' system, where the Toronto firm was the hub and the
other firms the spokes.
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that although their billings had remained constant, the quality and complexity of work had declined markedly over the past decade. And, most
importantly, with few exceptions, many of the non-Toronto firms acknowledged a much greater dependence on referral work from Toronto
for their practices.
In this scenario, the first wave of affiliations can be credited with
setting off a domino effect or, more colloquially, a rat race, that worked
to destabilize many of the traditional agency relationships that Toronto
firms had concluded with firms located in other parts of the country."O
Once a Toronto firm linked up with firms in Vancouver and Montreal,
whatever loose referral arrangements existed prior to the affiliation
between the Toronto firm and other firms in Vancouver and Montreal
were severed. That is, even under the terms of the lightest referral
arrangement, the Toronto firm would invariably be under an obligation
to refer work requiring counsel in either Montreal or Vancouver to the
firm's affiliate in either city. As a consequence, non-affiliated firms in
Montreal and Vancouver would refrain from referring work to an
affiliated Toronto firm 'because the Toronto firm couldn't return the
favour.' As well as the loss in reciprocal referral work, many nonaffiliated firms outside Toronto expressed the concern that a referral to
a Toronto firm risked the danger that the Toronto firm would attempt
to 'steal the client' by using the referral transaction as an opportunity to
sell the client on the services of the Toronto firm's affiliate in the
referring firm's jurisdiction."' Both of these concerns forced firms outside
Toronto to follow the leader by entering into separate affiliations with
Toronto firms. Mirroring these trends, unaffiliated Toronto firms - also
fearful of the prospect of client stealing resulting from referrals to
affiliated firms in other jurisdictions - found that the pool of possible
firms to which they could refer work outside Toronto was dwindling
rapidly. The more that this pool shrank, the more anxious unaffiliated
Toronto firms became with the quality of unaffiliated firms remaining in
Vancouver and Montreal. This concern propelled the Toronto firms'
affiliations with unaffiliated firms remaining in Montreal and Vancouver.

110 The term rat race is taken from G. Akerlof 'The Economics of Caste and of the
Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales' (1976) 90 Q. J. of Econ. 599. According to
Akerlof, '[iln the rat race the chances of getting the cheese increase with the speed
of the rat, although no additional cheese is provided' (at 603).
111 Interestingly, prior to the wave of affiliations, most firms professed to have no
institutional commitments to refer work to firms in other cities. In the main, the
referral decision was remitted to individual partners, without any outside
interference. This laissez-faire attitude resulted in fairly random referral patterns in
most firms insofar as firms in another city were concerned.
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If correct, this scenario has profound implications for the survival of
these recently minted affiliations. While some national affiliations were
no doubt provoked by the pursuit of real efficiencies, the fact that many
are predicated on defensive concerns suggests that not all were designed
to obtain such benefits. If this is accurate, one can expect consumers to
push for a dismantling of these costly affiliations in short order. Indeed,
several lawyers claimed that a number of the largest corporations were
undermining the survival of affiliations by refusing to have their work
directed to designated affiliates. Under this scenario, the open question
is what the effect of these affiliations is on the welfare of less sophisticated
consumers. Will their welfare be augmented by the benefits from
increased levels of national interaction, or will it be compromised by the
fact that their out-of-province agency work is being driven by affiliate
obligations rather than professional expertise?
D. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

1. The greenfield arrangement explored
As mentioned above, to the degree that Canadian law firms have en-

deavoured to enter foreign markets, they have relied principally on entry
by way of greenfield branches rather than on other, less costly instruments, namely aff~liation."' By and large, these ventures were aimed at
cultivating foreign clients interested in undertaking investment activity in

112 There were some exceptions to this general rule. In Calgary, at least two firms had
concluded affiliation arrangements with American law firms, having specialized
expertise in the oil and gas industry. In Toronto, there is some evidence of growing
affiliation activity between firms in that city and firms in Hong Kong (for example,
Smith Lyons; Davies Ward & Beck). Another way in which Canadian firms have
affiliated with foreign law firms is through membership in large transnational
affiliations such as Lex Mundi and Norton RoseIM5. Lex Mundi provides a
framework for the professional exchange of information about the development of
local and international law among its members. Each member firm retains complete
autonomy and is not restricted in referring, handling, or accepting cases, nor in
joining other professional organizations. Members are not allowed to use Lex Mundi
on their letterheads, and the association does not undertake advertising or
marketing. However, a confluence of several factors worked to undermine the
commitment of Canadian firms to these enterprises, including: (1) the large size of
these affiliations and the lack of supportive personal relationships; (2) the fact that
competitors located in the same Canadian city were sometimes members of the same
referral group; (3) the relatively shallow nature of the commitments entailed by the
organization; and (4) the existence of foreign branches of the Canadian firm,
supported independently or with other affiliates, in markets where the firm had the
most expertise and interest.
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Canada, although there were some notable exception^."^ These exceptions usually took the form of firms serving very explicit needs of
established clients in a specific market - for example, the decision by
Toronto firms to open offices in London to service the legal needs of
Canadian clients in Euromarket borrowings. And although a handful of
firms asserted broader ambitions for their foreign offices, these aspirations are suspect, given the onerous restrictions on the capacity of
Canadian firms to practice indigenous law in most foreign jurisdictions.
These restrictions limit Canadian lawyers to refer and accompany
Canadian clients to local lawyers practising indigenous law. Presumably,
there are natural limits operating on the willingness of Canadian clients
to compensate firms for 'chaperon' services."*
Table 6 shows that the foreign offices of Canadian firms are concentrated principally in London and Hong Kong, with Taipei, New York,
and Paris being important secondary locations. By and large, most
branches were now being operated - at least in name - by Canadian
affiliate groups. While most affiliations supported one foreign office,
others have supported as many as four. Usually, primary responsibility
for the staffing and operation of the foreign office was allocated to one
of the affiliating firms, with provision for minor participation by the other
affiliates. The lead or managing affiliate for Far Eastern offices was
usually the Vancouver firm; for London and New York, the Toronto
firm; and for Continental Europe, the Montreal firm. This pattern is
consistent with the nature and flow of business activity between Canadian
and foreign cities. In a few cases, however, a committee of senior
partners from the affiliating firms assumed collective responsibility for
management of the foreign offices, with no single firm playing a preeminent role.
Interestingly, in most cases, the international offices were organized
under a separately constituted partnership among the affiliates, with each
affiliate having equal rights and obligations for partnership profits and
losses. Nevertheless, despite the relatively clear sharing rules implied by
the partnership form of organization, the actual allocation of profits and
losses pursuant to these arrangements was anything but straightforward.
In many cases partners confessed that answering the logically prior

113 As a number of firms stated, the opening of foreign ofices is basically a way of
searching for 'high net worth individuals' or 'elephants' who are anxious to
undertake extensive investment in Canada. Many firms were inspired by the success
of Stikeman Elliott in cultivating the patronage of Mr Li Ka-Shing.
114 As one lawyer stated, 'Canadian clients do not need Canadian lawyers to serve as
glorified taxi drivers in London and Paris.'

question of where and in what amounts expenditures and revenues
having an international aspect would be allocated, that is, either to the
international partnership or directly to the affiliates, proved to be a
highly fractious exercise, given that in the former case the affiliates share
equally, while in the latter case, the entire benefit or burden of the
activity inures to one of the affiliates.
The inversion of predicted outcomes (extensive reliance on affiliations)
and actual outcomes (extensive reliance on greenfield entry) is rendered
even more perplexing when the very considerable cost of greenfield entry
is con~idered."~Most firms interviewed admitted that, under any
accounting measure, the economic performance of their affiliates was
disastrous. And although a part of the losses was attributed to high startup costs, a number of lawyers expressed concern with the potential for
these costs to persist at the same or higher levels for several years,
creating further losses for the participating affiliates. Another factor
contributing to the concern over the financial viability of foreign offices
is the tendency of Canadian affiliate groups to follow each other in
establishing branches in the same foreign jurisdiction. If the rationale for
foreign offices is based on the prospect of diverting a fixed supply of
work of foreign clients to the Canadian affiliates, then, cetmk paribus, the
entry of multiple firms into the same jurisdiction will result in a situation
where too many firms are chasing too few clients, ensuring that, in the
short run at least, no office is able to earn a normal rate of return.

2. Alternative explanationsfor international greenfielding
In view of the inherent expense and risk of the greenfield route in the
international context, why have Canadian firms favoured this technique
over other available instruments of growth, particularly the affiliation
instrument? Several possible explanations exist, including: (a) maintenance of non-exclusive agency relationships; (b) uncertain liability
effects; and (c) lack of opportunities for effective pre-association
investigation. I will examine each of these in turn.
a. Maintenance of non-exclusive agency relationships. One possible explanation for the reluctance of firms to enter into affiliation relationships

115 These costs should not be measured solely in financial terms. Among the costs that
firms have to concern themselves with are the costs of sending senior counsel to the
foreign jurisdiction to set up the branch. As one partner told us, 'any partner good
enough, in terms of his or her technical expertise and entrepreneurial skills, to be
vested with the responsibility of establishing a new office in a foreign country is
someone whose absence will be deeply felt in the main office.'

204

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL

reflects the unwillingness of law firms, both in Canada and abroad, to
compromise the current set of nonexclusive agency relationships that
exist between Canadian and foreign firms. In the absence of destabilizing
first moves, such as the much ballyhooed but yet to be consummated
great trans-Atlantic a~sociation,"~
firms prefer to maintain the rather
haphazard pattern of existing referral arrangements. As pointed out in
the discussion respecting national affiliations, a strong case can be made
that these informal arrangements are better equipped to vindicate
consumer welfare goals than the highly orchestrated firm-to-firm
relationships flowing from the affiliation model. And, most importantly,
given that the creation of an exclusive referral relationship with one firm
resident in a foreign jurisdiction entails an inevitable termination of
relationships with other firms in the jurisdiction, firms may be reluctant
to upset a stable supply of referral work from many firms in favour of
more speculative benefits that are to be derived from an exclusive
relationship with one firm. Not surprisingly, this reluctance will be
greatest among firms that, owing to their strong reputation, are able to
capture more than a pro ratu share of referral work from foreign
jurisdictions. In these terms, the decision to open a foreign office abroad
is consistent with respect for the current set of informal referral
arrangements. By refusing to practice indigenous law and by not aligning
themselves with any particular foreign firm, lawyers going abroad are
able to enhance their market share without alienating firms resident in
the foreign juri~diction."~
However, as was discussed in the context of
national affiliations, given the vulnerability of these informal arrangements to destabilizing first moves resulting in the establishment of formal
affiliation arrangements, it is not clear that the greenfield strategy is
sustainable over the long run. Accordingly, it may be far more sensible
for firms to reconcile themselves to a obtaining a more certain but more
modest share of referral work by way of affiliation rather than opting for
riskier greenfield strategies.
b. Uncertain liability effects. Another impediment to the affiliation route
in an international context emanates from the uncertain prospects of

116 The great trans-Atlantic merger has been 'imminent' for several years, and, when
effected, is expected to involve a leading American, English, and, perhaps, Canadian
law firm.
117 Presumably, the assiduously cultivated independence of the two New York firms
practising law in Toronto (Shearman Sterling; Skadden Arps) is based on the desire
to avoid jeopardizing existing referral arrangements. It is, of course, questionable
whether this strategy will be adhered to, given additional entry of other American
firms to Canada.

legal liability for the Canadian firm from the conduct of lawyers in the
foreignjurisdiction. Even though most affiliation arrangements imply the
continuation of separately constituted firms, the ambiguity inherent in
the affiliation device, in respect of the degree of integration created
among the firms, raises the prospect of latent liability for acts done by the
foreign affiliate over which the Canadian firm has little, if any, control.
These concerns are heightened by the limited understanding of Canadian
lawyers with the actual standard of legal and ethical duties that govern
the conduct of lawyers in the foreign country. Many lawyers interviewed
explained that the fear of unknown liabilities stemming from foreign
affiliations is especially significant in the case of law firms, given the
presence of highly specialized and only partially diversified investments
by lawyers in human capital and unlimited personal liability for partnership debts. Nevertheless, one suspects that market insurance contracts
would be available to reduce at least part of the risk, making this factor
a somewhat tenuous basis for rejecting foreign affiliations.

c. Lack of opportunities for effective pre-association investigation. The final
reason for Canadian law firms eschewing the affiliation instrument in
favour of greenfielding relates to the limited opportunities for firms to
acquire sufficient information about a potential affiliation partner prior
to the affiliation. Since even the shallowest affiliation requires some
investment in rationalization and coordination activities and ties up some
portion of the firm's reputational capital, Canadian firms will wish to gain
some comfort about the quality of their partner. But, because opportunities for intense firm-to-firm contacts are necessarily less frequent in
the case of international as opposed to national associations, the potential
for extensive pre-association investigation of the other firm is commensurately reduced. Nevertheless, as the pace of transnational economic
activity accelerates, one would expect such problems to become less
severe, thereby enhancing the attractiveness of these relationships.
VI

Conclusion

In this article, I have attempted to enrich our understanding of the
corporate law firm by considering its evolution in Canada over the last
decade. Not only did I find that the pressure for the Canadian law firm
to grow derived from an amalgam of different supply- and demand-side
factors, but I also found that there are myriad different instruments that
can be deployed to realize law firm growth, each of which has quite
different value depending on the context in which the growth is to be
effected. Nevertheless, despite considerable effort in the development of

a theoretical framework that would illuminate patterns of growth, examination of actual growth patterns discloses a puzzling chasm between
theory and praxis. Although I offered several possible explanations for
the divergence, none seemed wholly satisfactory, and further work is
needed to understand why certain seemingly perverse organizational
developments have taken place.
Yet, despite the inability of the theoretical framework to adequately
predict patterns of growth, it seems that the correct approach to take
when examining the law firm is to focus on the rationale for growth and
the instruments of growth. Far too much effort in organizational theory
has been directed to the task of providing rationales for highly simplistic
and static conceptions of various organizational forms that abstract
liberally from reality. This penchant is surprising given the premium that
organizational theorists have placed on Darwinian survival mechanisms
in explaining the triumph of certain economic institutions. If, to
paraphrase Sartre, the organization, like persons, is constantly in the
process of becoming, it behooves scholars to direct far greater attention
to the highly charged and dynamic market processes that exert a daily
influence on the firm. So doing will illuminate those features of the legal
landscape that either impede or nurture the firm's natural evolutionary
processes.'18

118 The spirited debate between Jack Carr and Frank Mathewson and Ronald Gilson
respecting the impact of unlimited liability on the structure of the legal industry has
provided a good example of the kind of questions policy-makers should be thinking
about: see Carr and Mathewson 'Unlimited Liability as a Barrier to Entry' supra
note 7 and Gilson 'Unlimited Liability and Law Firm Organization' supra note 7.
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